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THE BATTLE OF MARS AND VENUS:

WHY

Do

AMERICAN AND

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL

LAW DIFFER?'
Robert J. Delahunty

t

International law is merely a magnifying mirror that reflects faithfully and
cruelly the essence and logic of international politics. In a fragmented
world, there is no 'global perspective' from which anyone can authoritatively assess, endorse, or reject the separate national efforts at making
international law serve national interests above all. Like the somber universe of Albert Camus' Caligula, this is a judgeless world where no one is
innocent. 2
I.

Introduction

Why do American and European attitudes toward international law appear to
differ so profoundly? What explains the United States' (supposedly) characteristic "unilateralism" in international law? 3 This article examines one very rich and
fascinating theory of the difference-that of Professor Jed Rubenfeld of the Yale
Law School 4 -and advances another. To be more exact, the article analyzes Professor Rubenfeld's theory, which is framed primarily in terms of the differences
between American and European constitutional values, and attempts to weigh its
merits against those of a theory that focuses instead on divergent political
interests.

Part II of this article provides an introductory overview of recent AmericanEuropean conflicts over the application of international law. The overview will
I My title alludes, of course, to Robert Kagan's now-famous remark that "on major strategic and
international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus." ROBERT
KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 4 (2003).
t
Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law. Former Deputy General
Counsel, White House Office of Homeland Security; Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice; Special Counsel to the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor. B.A. Columbia
summa cum laude; B.A. Oxford, First Class; B. Phil. Oxford; J.D. Harvard School of Law cum laude.
My chief thanks go to the United States-Israel Educational Foundation for inviting me to present an
earlier version of this paper at the Fulbright Israel/USIEF 50th Anniversary Symposium, "International
Influences on National Legal Systems," held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya on January 29-30, 2006. I also wish to thank John 0. McGinnis and John C. Yoo
for their valuable comments.
2 Stanley Hoffman, The Uses and Limits of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ANARCHY, FORCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND DECISION MAKING, 126, 129 (Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis eds.,
2d ed. 1985).
3 A disclaimer: As a government attorney at the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of
Justice, I provided advice regarding some of the U.S. legal positions discussed in this essay.
4 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971
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consider four situations in which such conflict has emerged. It shall argue that
the United States had reasonable international law defenses for its conduct in
each of those instances and, indeed, that it has the better of the legal argument in
most of them. The common European charge that the United States has been
merely "lawless" in its recent conduct in international affairs 5 is exaggerated and
unfounded. Nonetheless, there are sufficiently serious and substantial differences
between the United States and Europe over the status and application of international legal norms that a theoretical explanation for those differences seems required. The attempt to find a satisfactory explanation unfolds into three main
parts.
Part III outlines Professor Rubenfeld's theory of the difference between American and European attitudes toward international law. Rubenfeld's theory depends on a contrast between two distinct conceptions of constitutional law: one
that he calls "democratic constitutionalism," and the other that he calls "international constitutionalism." Democratic constitutionalism, which reflects a characteristically American outlook, traces the nation's organic law to a founding act of
popular lawmaking. International constitutionalism sees constitutional law, not
as deriving from an act of democratic self-government, but as deriving from universal, hence transnational, principles and rights. These principles and rights-in
effect, an overarching structure of natural law in which particular national r6gimes should be embedded-operate to restrain rather than to express democracy. On Rubenfeld's account, international constitutionalism underlies the legal
systems of at least some of the major western European nations. The divergent
constitutional traditions of the United States and Europe reflect, in large measure,
the different reactions of the United States and Europe to the horrors of Nazism
and the violence of the Second World War. In turn, each of these conceptions of
constitutionalism generates a distinctive approach to international law.
Rubenfeld's analysis is framed in the different values expressive of two different constitutional traditions and cultures. Without altogether disagreeing with it,
I shall argue that an alternative theory seems to have equivalent, if not more,
explanatory power. Part IV offers a theory of the international law divergence
between the United States and Europe that sounds in interests rather than in values. Thus, the theory represents a more banal and commonplace explanation
5 Thus, to take one entirely representative European intellectual, the British-Polish sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman informs us that Europe-"and only Europe"-can offer a "salutary alternative" to
America in the creation of a humane and civilized world order:
At a time when America, which relegated Europe to the second division of power games, has...
'disqualified itself from the fight for security, prosperity, and justice,' Europe ... stoutly refuses
'to regard force as a source of justice,' and even more so to confuse the two, and it is well placed
to 'oppose the United States as justice opposes force rather than as weakness opposes power.'
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, EUROPE: AN UNFINISHED ADVENTURE 39 (2004) (emphasis in original, citations
omitted). In a similar vein, the German philosopher Jirgen Habermas has opined that
[t]he Bush administration, with moralistic phrases ad acta, has laid aside the 220-year-old Kantian project for the legalizing of international relations. The comportment of the American administration allows for only one conclusion, that, as they see it, international law is finished as a
medium for the resolution of conflicts between states, and for the advancement of democracy and
human rights.
America and the World: A Conversation with Jurgen Habermas, with Eduardo Mendieta, http://www

.logosjoumal.com/habermasamerica.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006) (emphasis in original).
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than Rubenfeld's. 6 On this alternative approach, both U.S. and European policyto promote and serve
makers and dlites use international law instrumentally,
7
competing national interests in various ways.
The proffered explanation takes its start from the unremarkable observation
that the post-Cold War United States is the global hegemon. In its view of itself,
the United States uses its power benignly: 8 it functions as the chief global provider of public goods, including peace, order, and trade. 9 Although this is not
due entirely to altruism on the part of the United States, it may well have some
altruistic features. The real risk to global peace and order is not that the United
States will behave more and more like a traditional imperial power, but that its
people will weary of their nation's global responsibilities (isolationism)' 0 or that,
as theorists like Paul Kennedy 1I and Niall Ferguson' 2 have forecast, it will find
itself financially overspent and overstretched. Should the United3 States fail at
nation-building in Iraq, this risk will likely become aggravated.'
6 Rubenfeld does not deny the possibility of interest-based explanations, but contends that by "explaining everything so well, [they] explain little with any depth." Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1984.
7 The "Realist" school of international relations has long taken the view that international law may
be, and often is, used both to cloak and to promote national or hegemonic interests. See, e.g., EDWARD
HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 73-75, 82-83 (2d ed. 1946). Carr is also correct to insist, however, that "[t]he
necessity, recognized by all politicians, both in domestic and international affairs, for cloaking interests
in the guise of moral principles is itself a symptom of the inadequacy of realism." Id. at 92.
8 The view that the United States' hegemonic role is generally benign is shared by American writers
of very different ideological standpoints. See, e.g., WILLIAM KRISTOL & ROBERT KAGAN, Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy 22 (2000); Charles Krauthammer,
The UnipolarMoment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (1990/91); George Weigel, Moral Clarity in a Time of War,
available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ftO3Ol/articles/weigel.html; ROBERT D. KAPLAN, WARRIOR POLITICS: WHY LEADERSHIP DEMANDS A PAGAN ETHOS 109, 127 (2002). For a far less sympathetic
(European) reading of American dominance and its uses, see generally EMMANUEL TODD, AFTER THE
EMPIRE: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AMERICAN ORDER (2003). For a critical American perspective, see
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS:
LEGACY 111-13 (2006).

DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE

9 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 792-93 (2004) (analyzing questions
of international security in terms of "public goods" approach); LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY:
POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER WORLD 115-18 (1994) (outlining "hegemonic stability
theory"); see generally MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: How AMERICA ACTS AS THE
WORLD'S GOVERNMENT IN THE 21ST Century (2005).
10 See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR & CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 168-69 (1981). Gilpin analyzes why
the costs of dominance for a hegemonic power tend to rise and pointing out the consequences of the fact
that hegemonic providers of public goods tend to overpay for them:
[t]he increasing costs of protection and the fact that... hegemonic powers tend to overpay mean
that in time the costs of protection of the status quo rise faster than [its] economic benefits ....
With increasing costs and decreasing revenues ... hegemony become[s] decreasingly profitable.
As in any enterprise, a decrease in the rate of profit is a sign of potential bankruptcy.
Id.; see also Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, 17 INT'L
SECURITY 5, 34 (1993) (stating even "benign" hegemony tends to precipitate the hegemon's relative
decline).
II See generally PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE
AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987).
12 See generally NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE (2004).
13 See ROBERT K. BRIGHAM, IS IRAQ ANOTHER VIETNAM? 164-65 (2006) (noting recent swing in
American public opinion "away from internationalism and toward isolationism" in wake of policy set-

Volume 4, Issue I

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

The Battle of Mars and Venus
Moreover, despite their reluctance to admit it, it seems likely that, at present,
most other major nations, including the European ones, largely agree in practice
with the self-image drawn by the United States, and are not actively seeking to
overturn the American ascendancy. In the sixty years of the Long Peace that has
settled on Western Europe since the end of the Second World War, it has benefited substantially from America's dominant global role. Europe appears, however, to rest less and less easy under the current arrangements. To some extent,
political and military cooperation with the United States is simply less necessary
after the Soviet collapse. Moreover, if Europe faces a "near enemy," it is Islamic
and, to a great extent, disturbingly home-grown.1 4 And close cooperation with
the United States may not be the most effective way to counter that threat.
The post-Cold War stage is therefore set for the emergence of conflicts between the United States and Europe; and those conflicts have begun to dawn.
One might even trace the origins of renewed conflict as far back as an early
phase of the Cold War-the 1957 creation of the six-member European Economic Community. For as Richard Rosecrance has argued, European economic
and political integration after 1957 "provided a make-weight to the superpowers.
One must remember that the launching of Europe took place after the invasions
of Suez and Hungary and (from the European point of view) reflected the unreliability of the alliance with America as well as the probable hostility of the Soviet
Union." 15 Whenever one thinks the seeds were first planted, what looks like a
traditional Great Power rivalry seems to have started to sprout. 16 The pervasive7
presence of American hegemony may be creating a classic "security dilemma"'
backs in Iraq, and raising possibility that there will be an "Iraq syndrome" comparable to the "Vietnam
syndrome").
14 See generally OLIVIER Roy, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH (2004); GILLES

THE REVENGE OF GOD (1994). Large numbers of young European Muslims, even if born in
Europe and outwardly assimilated, "are drawn to the idea of a Muslim 'ummah' (nation) to which they
could belong." Roula Khalaf & Jonathan Guthrie, Europe's Radical Young Muslims Turn to Violence,
FIN. TIMES, July 9/10, 2005 at A2; see also Robert Winnett & David Leppard, Leaked No. 10 dossier
reveals Al-Qaeda's British recruits, SUNDAY TIMES, July 10, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline
.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1688261,00.html. An unknown number of radicalized young British and French
Muslims have also been volunteering to join a] Qaeda forces fighting in Iraq, giving rise to police fears of
violent "blowback" when they return. See Peter Taylor, A reason to hate, GUARDIAN Sept. 1, 2006,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329566119-111274,00.html.
15 Richard Rosecrance, Mergers and Acquisitions, 80 NAT'L INT. 65, 67 (2005).
KEPEL,

16 The possibility of the emergence of traditional "Great Power" conflict between the United States
and Europe (or some parts of Europe) cannot be dismissed as idle. Indeed, the historical record shows
that the very existence of a hegemonic power, even a non-threatening, "benign" one, is likely to produce
rivals.
This is because the threat inheres in the hegemon's power. In a unipolar world, others must
worry about the hegemon's capabilities, not its intentions. The preeminent power's intentions
may be benign today but may not be tomorrow.... Moreover, even a hegemon animated by
benign motives may pursue policies that run counter to others' interests.

Layne, supra note 10, at 13-14. The United States' own history demonstrates that as the nation's power
grew in the late nineteenth century, it grew increasingly restive under the hegemony of Great Britain,
even though the United States was a major beneficiary of Britain's preeminence and was hardly
threatened by it. See id. at 27-28.
17 See John H. Herz, Idealist Internationalismand the Security Dilemma, in THE NATION-STATE AND
THE CRISIS OF WORLD POLITICS:

ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

72-98 (John H. Herz, ed., 1976).
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political integrafor European nations, ultimately driving them toward complete
18
tion and the formation of a unitary European "superstate."'
One may take the existence, or at least emerging possibility, of such American-European rivalry as the basis for an explanation of the two parties' divergent
attitudes toward international law. Such an explanation would differ from
Rubenfeld's in seeing conflicting interests, and not differing values, as the chief
source of the divergence. The United States is interested in maintaining its dominating position in world affairs; Europe is interested, not so much perhaps in
supplanting the United States, as in checking and counter-balancing it. International law then becomes an instrument that can be wielded in that power conflict.
Nonetheless, this article will also argue, both sides also have a substantial
interest in mitigating the conflicts between them and in restoring their relations
nearer to equilibrium. This, of course, includes compromising their outstanding
differences over international law. I shall argue that we are seeing specific attempts to bridge these legal differences, and that the initiatives are coming from
both sides. To illustrate this tendency, I shall briefly discuss Security Council
Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, which in practical terms (whether or not in
legal effect) cleansed the United States from the taint of "illegitimacy" caused by
the assumedly unauthorized use of force against Iraq earlier in the year.
Finally, Part V shall attempt, very briefly and allusively, to outline a possible
approach that seeks to reconcile Professor Rubenfeld's values-based theory with
the theory that emphasizes national interests. This attempt at reconciliation starts
from the observation, made several years ago by the distinguished political scientist Robert Putnam, that
[t]he politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived
as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their
interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At
the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. 19
Although Putnam's theory has its origins in international negotiations over
matters such as trade and currency rates, it can be adapted to negotiations over
human rights and international humanitarian law. By viewing Euro-American
differences over international law as such a two-level game, one can appreciate,
first, that important European domestic political constituencies may have
strongly critical views of American foreign and military policies, based on the
values and norms that those constituencies espouse; second, that European governments, including of course their executive branches, will inevitably be highly
sensitive to those constituencies' demands and will reflect those demands in their
18

See

GLYN MORGAN, THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE:

PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND EURO-

PEAN INTEGRATION 161-62 (2005).

19 Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427, 434 (1988).
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policy deliberations and choices; but also that, third, those executive branches
will be dealing with the United States across a wide array of matters of common
concern, will look for the support and cooperation of the United States on many
of them, and will therefore be reluctant to unduly offend the United States (or its
executive). Hence, one would expect to find-and, it is argued, we do in fact
find-a pattern of, on the one hand, highly vocal, values-based European condemnations of American foreign and military policies that use the language of
international law and, on the other hand, a more muted, less censorious approach
to the same American policies on the part of European governments, especially
executive branches.
In this type of analysis of Euro-American differences over international law,
both values and interests contribute to the explanation. Values drive the condemnations of interested sectors of European publics, interests underlie the more tempered and pragmatic approach of European leaders.
II.

The United States and European Differences: Four Examples

The fact there are deep differences between the United States and several of
its major continental European allies (chiefly France and Germany) seems plain
enough. One need only consider the visit in January 2006 by the new German
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to Washington, D.C., during which she repeated,
both privately to President Bush and in public, an opinion that she had previously
expressed in an interview with Der Spiegel: the U.S. detention camps at Guantanamo Bay "should not exist. ' '20 The existence of these camps is a longstanding
cause of complaint by European leaders. 21 Chancellor Merkel's references to
and Euthem seemed only to underscore the depth and persistence of American
22
ropean views of the legality of the practice by the United States.
20 See M. Bush defend la 'nicessitt' de Guantanamodevant Mme. Merkel; En visite 6 Washington, la
chancelidreallemande a exposi sa 'divergence' sur la base de Guantanamo. George Bush n 'a rien cjd,
Le Monde, Jan. 15, 2006, at 6, available at 2006 WLNR 794189.
21 See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONF Icr 129 (2005) ("Rumsfeld's disdain for international humanitarian law became blatantly apparent in
January 2002 when suspected Taliban and al Qaeda members were transported to the U.S. naval base in
Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. Ignoring public criticism from a number of European leaders, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and even the normally neutral and extraordinarily discrete [sic] International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), the Secretary of Defense insisted the detainees were not
prisoners of war ....In November 2002, the English Court of Appeal correctly described the position of
the Guant~namo Bay detainees as 'legally objectionable'; it was as if they were in a 'legal black hole."').
In fact, both Secretary Rumsfeld's position and that of the ICRC at the time were considerably more
nuanced than Professor Byers' heated description allows. See Adam Roberts, Counter-terrorism,Armed
Force and the Laws of War, Soc. Sci. Research Council, 18 (2002), http://www.ssrc.org/septl l/essays/
roberts.htm; Sean D. Murphy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as POWs, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 479 (2002) (quoting ICRC formal press release of Feb. 9, 2002).
22 Subsequently, in an interview on May 4, 2006, with ARD German Television, President Bush,
after emphasizing the closeness both of the U.S-German alliance and of his own personal relationship
with Chancellor Merkel ("Who I call Angela, by the way") told his German audience that "obviously, the
Guantinamo issue is a sensitive issue for people. I very much would like to end Guantdnamo; I very
much would like to get people to a court." Interview by Sabine Christiansen of President George W.
Bush, May 4, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/print/20060507-3.html; see also
Press Conference of the President, June 14, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20
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But appearances can be deceptive; even this apparently significant conflict
between German and American legal and policy views proves, on closer examination, to be far more muted than it might at first have seemed. Aides to Chancellor Merkel reportedly worked hard to persuade the German press delegation
that her visit to Washington "[was] not about detentions at Guantanamo Bay,"
and the Chancellor's remarks to Der Spiegel were "an attempt to get an awkward
subject out of the way early."'2 3 The U.S. State Department's press release, headlined by a reference to the President and Chancellor's "full agreement on Iran,"
stated only that "[t]he two leaders said in a joint press conference that their meeting marked a renewed sense of unity of purpose between the two allies despite a
continuing difference on issues such as the detainees in the War on Terror held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."' 24 At the press conference itself, Chancellor Merkel
said that she had merely "mentioned Guantanamo" in her meeting with the President. When the President responded by affirming unequivocally that "Guantanamo is a necessary part of protecting the American people," the Chancellor
replied mildly that "what counts is that we come back to the situation where we
openly address all of the issues. '25 In other words, the fact that the two leaders
were able to discuss Guantanamo candidly was to be taken as evidence, not so
much of an intractable difference over the requirements of international law, as
of the strength, intimacy, and resilience of the German-American alliance.
The lesson to be drawn from the Bush-Merkel exchange is not, of course, that
Americans and Europeans do not disagree in their attitudes toward international
law. They do disagree, and the disagreements may be substantial. But the exchange should also caution us not to exaggerate the differences. Further, it is
also fair to say that while there have been numerous conflicts in recent years
between American and European governments on matters relating to international law, by no means have all of those conflicts involved real, or even alleged,
violations of international law by the United States. Consider the following four
contentious episodes:

060614.html ("I'd like to close Guantdnamo, but I also recognize that we're holding some people that are
dam dangerous.").
23 Bertrand Bernoit & Hugh Williamson, Merkel foreign policy signals warmer relationshipwith US.
BernardBenoit reports on the German chancellor's aim of correcting the balance in her country's ties
with Washington and Moscow, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at 8, available at 2006 WLNR 718362.
24 State Dep't: Bush, Germany's Merkel in Full Agreement on Iran, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 13, 2006,
at 1 2, available at 2006 WLNR 768294.
25 President George W. Bush & Chancellor Angela Merkel, Remarks by President Bush and ChancellorAngela Merkel of the FederalRepublic of Germany in Joint Press Availability, Jan. 13, 2006, http:/
/www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/59152.htm. In fact, the Chancellor went even further to minimize the disagreement. She stated that the question of detention was "only one facet in our overall fight against
terrorism" and that she "completely share[d] [President Bush's] assessment as regards the nature and
dimension of th[e terrorist] threat." Indeed, she even implicitly faulted her own and other European
countries which, she said "need to come up with convincing proposals as to how we ought to deal with
detainees." Id.
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A.

The Kyoto Protocol

Notwithstanding vigorous European protests over the unwillingness of the
United States to become a party to the Kyoto Protocol, there is no question but
that, as a matter purely of internationallaw, the United States was well within its
rights as a sovereign nation not to ratify that treaty. 26 Whatever the policy merits
or demerits of the decision by the United States not to ratify, it was legally unassailable. Indeed, if either side should be faulted for violating international law, it
is those European parties to the Kyoto Protocol that the International Energy
Agency reports have missed their targeted reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions.
B.

27

The ABM Treaty

On December 13, 2001, President Bush announced that the United States had
given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with Article XV of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 ("ABM"), 28 that it would withdraw from the Treaty.
Despite the misgivings that some expressed, the United States was in full compliance with international law in taking that step. Article XV stated that "[e]ach
party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from
this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." The Treaty demanded six
months notice before withdrawal, which the United States gave. The Treaty
26 There are some unusual circumstances in which a State can be deemed to be bound to discharge
the obligations of a treaty to which it is not a signatory or a party. However, as the International Court of
Justice has noted, "it is not lightly to be presumed that a State which has not carried out these formalities
[of ratification or accession], though at all times fully able and entitled to do so, has nevertheless somehow become bound in another way." North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Reports 3, 25 (Feb. 20).
There is no reason to think that the United States has become bound to the Kyoto Protocol in some such
unusual way.
27 See Robert J. Samuelson, Greenhouse Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, June 29, 2005, at A21 ("Here are
some IEA estimates of the increases [in carbon dioxide emissions]: France, 6.9 percent; Italy, 8.3 percent; Greece, 28.2 percent; Ireland, 40.3 percent; the Netherlands, 13.2 percent; Portugal, 59 percent;
Spain, 46.9 percent."), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/28/
AR2005062801248_pf.html. The U.S. increase for the same period was 16.7%, not far from the global
total of 16.4%, and well below that of several European nations; see also Dan Seligman, Bye-Bye, Kyoto,
FORBES, Jan 9, 2006, at 130, available at 2006 WLNR 109018 ("The Kyoto rules say that western
Europe must get their emissions to a level 8% below those prevailing in 1990. But virtually all those
countries-the only significant exception is Germany-are going in the wrong direction."); Jon Walter,
World faces massive increase in C02 emissions as population grows, Agence France Presse English
Wire, July 19, 2005 ("Even those countries which have ratified the Kyoto protocol appear unlikely to
meets its modest goals ....
Between 1990 and 2002 Canada's CO 2 emissions rose by 22 percent and
Japan by 13 percent while those of the EU emissions have risen by 3.4 percent."); Amanda Brown, EU
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rise, Press Ass'n News Wire, June 21, 2005 ("The worldwide bid to curb
global warming suffered a major blow today as new figures showed EU emissions in the 15 oldest
member states increased by 1.3% between 2002 and 2003.... Today's figures also show the EU is way
off track in meeting its Kyoto Protocol target of cutting emissions by 8% by 2012."). Perhaps as a result
of the failures of its member States to meet the treaty's targets, the European Union has adopted a more
conciliatory attitude toward the U.S. approach to the problems of climate change. See Raf Casert, EU,
Washington look beyond Kyoto to tackle climate change, Associated Press Worldstream, Feb. 22, 2005.
28 Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 3435.
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otherwise merely required the withdrawing party to provide the other party with
an explanatory statement, apparently leaving it to each party's unilateral judgment whether "extraordinary events" such as to "jeopardize[] its supreme interests" had arisen. 29 President Bush's announcement referred both to the
fundamental changes that had occurred in world affairs since the Treaty had been
formed in 1972-including the disappearance of the Soviet Union, one of the
two original signatories-and the risk that weapons of mass destruction might
fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue States-a risk that, he said, required the
United States to abandon "a treaty that prevents us from developing effective
defenses." Whether or not one agrees with the United States' rationale, it would
be hard to claim that it was utterly unreasonable,or that adopting it demonstrated
disrespect for international treaty law. 30 Moreover, as a strategic matter, the introduction of ABM systems would not affect the stability of the international
security system by upsetting the nuclear balance between the United States and
Russia; it did, however, hold out the possibility of neutralizing the more limited
nuclear capacities of smaller, "rogue" States. 3' European and Russian reaction to
32
the action taken by the United States was muted.
C.

The Rome Statute

The United States has also come under criticism from the European Union for
its decision to "unsign" the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"). Nonetheless, the decision to "unsign" the Treaty, while perhaps
unprecedented, appears to be valid as a matter of international law. 33 Article
18(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties, 34 while imposing interim obligations on a nation that has signed a treaty but not yet ratified it, also clearly
contemplates that those interim obligations will lapse once the signatory "shall
have made clear its intention not to become a party to the treaty." That clause
seems clearly to entail that a signatory may indeed, before ratification, withdraw
its signature from the treaty. One careful legal study of the question of "unsigning" found that "the bottom line ... is that if a signatory feels burdened by the
interim obligation, and contemplates taking acts that might be viewed as violat29 See Frederick L. Kirgis, ProposedMissile Defenses and the ABM Treaty, AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L.
INSIGHTS (May 2001), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70.htm.
30 W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89
(2003) ("[T]he denunciation of the ABM treaty did not undermine the viability of the international treaty
regime, for the treaty in question was susceptible, by its terms, to termination, on notice.").
31 See id. at 86, 89.
32 See Eric A. Posner, International Law and the DisaggregatedState, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 797,
822 n.74 (2005).
33 See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty,
AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. INSIGHTS (May 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm.
34 Vienna Convention on Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un
.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1 1_1969.pdf. Although the United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention on Treaties, it regards most of its clauses as merely declaratory of customary
international law. See S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971) (describing the Vienna Convention as "the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice").
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ing a treaty's object and purpose, it can quickly disengage itself. ' 35 The United
States surely "made clear its intention" not to ratify the Rome Statute in a variety
of ways. The United States sent formal notice to the Rome Statute's depositary,
the United Nations; made clear official pronouncements both before and after
submitting that formal notice of its intent to unsign; and actively sought to enter
into treaty arrangements with nations hosting U.S. military bases that, if ratified,
would tend to defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Therefore, and
again, while European criticism of the decision by the United States not to participate in the ICC may or may not be sound as a policy matter, it is hard to find
fault with the decision as a matter purely of internationallaw.
Even more importantly, the United States' decision to unsign the Rome Statute
did not evince an arrogant "unilateralism," demonstrating the nation's unwillingness to join other leading members of the world community in an international
organization dedicated to enforcing the laws of war. The United States has had a
long record of supporting, and indeed initiating, legal developments in this area,
including its roles in founding the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg
and Tokyo, in helping to establish and operate the U.N. war crimes tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and even in negotiating the Rome Statute. As William
Schabas has observed, 36 the U.S. decision not to participate in the ICC stemmed
primarily from a fundamental change that was made during the negotiations concerning the powers of the Security Council. In 1994, when the International Law
Commission ("ILC") presented its report on the proposed ICC to the General
Assembly, the United States was well disposed to the idea. The ILC's draft
treaty provided for an ICC that fitted neatly within the existing legal scheme of
the United Nations Charter and that, therefore, was subordinate to the Security
Council. Draft Article 23(3) of the ILC's proposal would have provided that,
"No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation
which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the
peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides." In effect, the ILC would have given the Security
Council, and thus its Permanent Members (including the United States) a veto
over prosecutions before the ICC. Such an arrangement would have been consistent, not only with the overall Charter scheme, but with existing legal procedures
for the ad hoc United Nations criminal tribunals. At the insistence of nations
such as Germany and Canada at a later phase of the negotiations, however, this
provision was stricken. In its place, Article 16 of the Rome Statute merely permits the Security Council, to delay prosecution for up to a year (subject to renewal). To secure a temporary delay of even one year, the votes of all five
Permanent Members of the Council, and a nine-vote majority of all the Members,
is required. This, of course, represents an extremely severe dilution for the abil35 Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2082-83 (2003); see also id. at 2089
("Unsigning, in short, should be acknowledged as a legitimate and understandable course of action under
the Vienna Convention ....").
36 The discussion that follows in the text relies heavily on William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 701

(2004).
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ity of the United States to control prosecutions-a matter of overriding concern
to it as the world's dominant military power. 37 The insistence of the nations that
prevailed in the negotiations on this revision of the ILC draft seems to have
stemmed from their resentment of the special position that the Charter secures for
the Permanent Members of the Security Council. In other words, the disagreement was in essence merely a power struggle between medium- and small-sized
powers and the United States. It is surely difficult to see why the decision by the
United States not to participate in the ICC on those unfavorable terms should be
taken to show its hostility to international legal rdgimes, while Germany's and
Canada's pursuit of their own realpolitikobjectives, even at the risk of losing the
crucial support of the United States for the ICC, should not.
D.

The 2003 U.S.-Led Intervention in Iraq

The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in March, 2003, was perhaps the most important occasion on which the United States differed vehemently from several of its
traditional continental European allies over a vital question of international law.
The judgment of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan that the intervention was unlawful because the United States had not obtained specific authorization, in the form of a new Security Council Resolution before beginning
hostilities, is shared by many independent legal experts and scholars. 38 Nonetheless, this episode hardly justifies European complaints that the United States has
39
become heedless of international law.
As is well known, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter requires Member
States to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
37 The veto has indeed always been an indispensable feature of the Charter scheme from the United
States' perspective. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 193-94 (2003); INts L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 135-37 (3d ed. 1964); SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 904 (3d ed. 1951); see generally Dwight E. Lee, The Genesis of the
Veto, I INT'L ORG. 33 (1947).
38 For Annan's pre-war position, see Patrick E. Tyler & Felicity Barringer, Annan Says U.S. Will
Violate CharterIf It Acts without Approval, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2003, at A8. After the war, in an
interview on September 16, 2004, with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Annan repeated his view
that the intervention was illegal. See Excerpts: Annan Interview, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/
3661640.stm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006) ("I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN Charter,
from our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal.").
39 See Jacques de Lisle, Illegal? Yes. Lawless? Not So Fast: The United States, International Law,
and the War in Iraq, Foreign Research Pol'y Inst., March 28, 2003, available at http://www.fpri.org/
enotes/20030328.americawar.delisle.intllawwariraq.htm. ("True, the United States and its handful of
active partners in the coalition did not obtain the Security Council's specific authorization for their use of
force against Iraq, nor has the Bush administration articulated a credible claim that this is a case that falls
within one of the few, narrow exceptions permitting the international use of military force without Security Council authorization. But, contrary to what much of the chorus of criticism asserts or assumes,
unlawfulness is not the same as lawlessness. Eschewing or rejecting prescribed legal processes is not the
same thing as rejecting all legal principle. Not adhering to the international legal requirements set forth
in the U.N. Charter does not lead ineluctably to the world of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue in which the
strong do what they wish and the weak do what they must.").
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against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."' 40 Under
the Charter, armed force may be used by one State or group of States against
another only in two circumstances. First, Article 51 recognizes Member States'
"inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member." The United States and its coalition partners did not, however, place their primary reliance on the argument that their action against Iraq
was lawful under that provision. 4 1 Second, Article 42 of Chapter VII of the
Charter authorizes the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" in a troubled area. The original intervention by the United States against
Iraq in January, 1991, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, had been
authorized on precisely such a basis: Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990,
enacted "under Chapter VII of the Charter," expressly authorized "Member
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary
means" to enforce earlier Security Council Resolutions relating to the Kuwaiti
crisis against Iraq in the event that Iraq failed to comply with them beforehand.
The 1991 U.S.-led offensive came to a halt with the adoption of Security
Council Resolutions 686 of March 2, 1991, and 687 of April 8, 1991, which
40 On the background and meaning of the Charter clauses relating to international armed conflict see,
for example, JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
142-44 (2004).
41 To be more accurate: the United States made an Article 51 argument to the Security Council, but
in somewhat sketchy and allusive terms; the United Kingdom and Australia did not make such an argument in that forum. See HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 197-98, 205-07 (2003); ALAN M. DERSHOWrrz, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH
WAYS 153-89 (2006) (evaluating the position of the United States thoughtfully); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 Am. J.
INT'L L. 576, 582-85 (2003); Carl Bildt, Pre-emptive military action and the legitimacy of the use of
force: Remarksfrom a European Perspective, Jan. 13, 2003, http://www.bildt.net/documents/cb000003
.pdf; Walter B. Slocombe, Preemptive Military Action and the Legitimate Use of Force: An American
Perspective, Jan. 13, 2003, http://www.eusec.org/slocombe.htm. Outside the United Nations, the United
States did rely, sometimes quite heavily, on the claim that preemptive action or even preventive war
against "rogue states" and terrorists was compatible with international law; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss.pdf; see also Letter from President George W. Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (March 21, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030321-5.html (stating President's determination that further diplomatic efforts would
"neither adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed
by Iraq" nor "lead to the enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.").
The British position specifically rejected the idea that military action against Iraq was legally justified on
the grounds of preemptive self-defense. See Extractfrom Debate in the British House of Lords, Apr. 21,
2004, (remarks of Lord Goldsmith), in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 259-61 (Mary Ellen
O'Connell, ed., 2005). Instead Britain relied on the argument that Iraq's material breaches of Security
Council Resolutions authorized the resumption of hostilities. See Letter, Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. Doc. S/200/350 (Mar. 20, 2003); see also
Lord Goldsmith, Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq, New Labour, New Britain, Mar. 17, 2003,
available at http://www.labour.org.uk/news/legalbasis; Murphy, supra note 40, at 171-72 (discussing
and critiquing Goldsmith's opinion). The legal analysis that Lord Goldsmith, Britain's Attorney General,
communicated privately to Prime Minister Blair was considerably more guarded than his public memorandum. See Full text: Summary of Attorney General'sLegal Advice on March 7 2003, Guardian Unlimited, Apr. 27, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uklraq/Story/0,2763,1471655,00.html.
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imposed a variety of obligations upon the defeated Iraqi Government. 4 2 Both
before and more especially after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the United States sought to persuade the United Nations that
Iraq remained a danger to regional and world peace and security. Focusing on
Iraq's failure to permit United Nations inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify its undertaking to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, President Bush made it clear, in a speech to the General Assembly on September 12,
2002, that the United States wanted and expected the Security Council to
reauthorize armed intervention in Iraq, but that the United States was prepared to
act unilaterally in the absence of such a Resolution. The President stated, "We
will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the
'43
purposes of the United States should not be doubted.
As a result of the intense diplomatic activity that ensued and acting under
Chapter VII, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 of November 8,
2002. This resolution provided in part that "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687
(1991)." 44 Resolution 1441, however, unlike Resolution 678, did not authorize
the United States or other Member States to "use all necessary means" to bring
Iraq into compliance. Rather, Resolution 1441 reflected a two-stage approach
that had been advocated by France: disarmament through resumed inspections
or, if that failed, reconsideration by the Security Council of its options, including
recourse to force. 45 Four months after the adoption of Resolution 1441, the
United States and its coalition partners tabled a resolution that would have provided specific legal authorization to resume hostilities in Iraq. 4 6 France, supported by Russia and China, announced publicly that it would veto the draft
resolution, which had no chance of passage and was withdrawn. 47
42 Ironically (in light of later events), France argued at the end of the First Gulf War that the international coalition that had liberated Kuwait should protect the Kurdish forces that had risen in rebellion
against Saddam Hussein, notwithstanding the absence of Security Council authorization for that purpose,
while the United States objected that the coalition could not intervene because doing so would be unlawful interference in Iraq's internal affairs. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903, 904-09 (1992).
43 See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, New York,
New York (Sept. 12, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2O02/O9/20020912-1.html.

44 S.C. Res. 1441,

18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
See M. Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Remarks at
United Nations Security Council, Feb. 14, 2003, in U.N. Doc. S/PV.4707 at 11-13, available at http:II
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/NO3/248/19/PDF/N0324819.pdf?OpenElement.
46 See Prov. S.C. Res., U.N. Doc. S/2003/215 (Mar. 7, 2003). In any event, Secretary of State Colin
Powell had stated previously that, in the event of an Iraqi breach of Resolution 1441, the Security Council could "decide whether or not action is required," but the United States would "reserve our option of
acting" unilaterally and would "not necessarily be bound by what the Security Council might decide at
that point." Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A33.
47 See Ayman EI-Amir, A World United Against War, in AI-Ahram Weekly Online, Mar. 20-26,
2003, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2003/630/sc2.htm. President Bush remarked that "some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq . . . . The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its
responsibilities, so we will rise to ours." President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq (Mar.
17, 2003), in THE WMD MIRAGE 166, 167-68 (Craig R. Whitney, ed., 2003).
45
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In these circumstances, the United States took the legal position that Resolution 1441's finding that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of Security Council Resolution 687, coupled with Iraq's subsequent failure to cure those
and other breaches after the adoption of Resolution 1441, authorized the United
States and its coalition to resume the concededly lawful hostilities that had been
suspended eleven years earlier by Resolution 687.48 Several prominent legal
scholars 0agreed with the view taken by the United States. 49 Others, of course,
5
did not.
The purpose here is not to defend the legal position taken by the United States,
nor even to argue that it was a reasonable (if perhaps erroneous) one. Rather, the
point is that even if the United States, Britain, and Australia were clearly in error
about the legality of using force against Iraq, most of the continental European
governments that were critical of the coalition's position themselves had dirty
hands. 5 ' (France, which had insisted on the importance of Council authorization
for NATO's Kosovo intervention, was the unique exception. 52 ) For the NATO
Alliance's armed intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which was designed to prevent
Serbia from carrying out its program of ethnic cleansing, was certainly on no
better footing under international law than the U.S. coalition's intervention in
Iraq in 2003.53 Having themselves violated the very same constraints of the U.N.
48 See Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/350 (Mar. 20, 2003); see also William H. Taft & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003).
49 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877, 889-91 (2004);

Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida,
and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 34-36 (2003); Wedgwood, supra note 41, at 578-82; Ruth Wedg-

wood, Legal Authority Exists for a Strike on Iraq, FIN. TmEs, Mar. 14, 2003, at 19. For a sophisticated
defense of the United States' intervention (albeit one not keyed to the textual analysis of the relevant
Resolutions), see Michael D. Ramsey, Reinventing the Security Council: The U.N. as a Lockean System,

79 NoTRE DAm L. REV. 1529 (2004).
50 For a recent critique of the U.S. legal position see BYERS, supra note 21, at 44-45; see also Simon
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace After September 11: Axes of Evil and Wars Against Terror in Iraq

and Beyond, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 281, 288-97 (2005). See DUFv, supra note 41, at 201-02,
for a survey of some objections.
51 This is so even apart from the fact that French and Russian opposition to the United States' proposed intervention in Iraq was tainted by those two countries' deep involvement in the massive and
illegal manipulation of the United Nations' Oil-for-Food program. See Independent Inquiry Committee
into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programmeby the

Iraqi Regime at 22-78 (Oct. 27, 2005), available at http://www.iic-offp.org/story27oct05.htm (the
"Volcker Report").
52 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN, NATO, and InternationalLaw After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q.
57, 79 (2000). Germany and most other NATO allies "made arguments quite similar to the United States
in the Cuban Missile Crisis: even if NATO had not exactly met the requirements of the UN Charter, it
was close, and the deviation would neither set a precedent nor harm the Charter regime." Id. at 77. Of
course, defenders of the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 could and did argue that that "deviation" too
was at least "close" to compliance with the Charter, and in any case furthered the fundamental aims of
the Charter rgime.
53 Many of the pertinent legal objections are summarized in DAvID CHANDLER, FROM Kosovo TO
KABUL AND BEYOND: HUMAN RIGHTs AND HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION

127-39, 158-66 (2006); see

also Richard Falk, HumanitarianIntervention After Kosovo, in LESSONS OF Kosovo: THE DANGERS OF
HUMANTARIAN INTERVENTION 31-52 (Aleksander Jokie, ed., 2003); MICHAEL GLENNON, LtNirrs OF
LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER Kosovo ch. 1(2001); John Yoo, Using Force,
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Charter only four years earlier, the European governments involved in NATO's
Kosovo intervention could hardly claim that the United States was an interna4
tional scofflaw for having done so.5
What we should deduce from these four situations is that the views of the
United States and Continental Europe on the place of international law in regulating State practice are not as sharply opposed as is often assumed. Sometimes the
differences prove upon analysis to turn on policy rather than law. Sometimes the
conduct of the European nations, judged by the same standards they would apply
to the United States, is no better than American conduct. True, we have not
examined a host of other recent controversies between Europe and the United
States over international law including whether the United States could properly
denounce the optional protocol to the Vienna Consular Convention subjecting the
55
United States to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ");
whether the United States was correct in concluding that Taliban captives taken
in the Afghan conflict were not entitled as a matter of law to the status of prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention; whether the United States is
violating the Torture Convention or other international human rights treaties by
its (alleged) practices of detaining al Qaeda or Taliban captives indefinitely, of
holding them in secret locations without visitation by the International Committee of the Red Cross, or of subjecting them to coercive interrogation, or of attempting to assassinate particular al Qaeda leaders. Again, no one could deny
that these disagreements are real and substantial. But in acknowledging them, we
should also be careful not to reduce any characteristic differences there may be
between the United States and Europe over international law to the moralizing
simplicities of Maoist street theater.
Still, it seems hard to deny that there are some characteristic differences between the United States and the larger Continental European powers, not only
over the precise requirements of international law, but more importantly over the
role international law should play in controlling State practice. Allowing for the
hazards of grand simplifications, it may be fair to say that the United States,
unlike the European nations, typically prefers a "positivistic" approach to questions of international law, 56 tending to acknowledge no international legal duties
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 735 (2004); Dinstein, supra note 49, at 881; Jules Lobel, Benign Hegemony?
Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 1 Cm. J. INT'L L. 19 (2000); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN
and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EuR. J. I-r'L L. 1 (1999). But see Louis Henkin, Kosovo and
the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 826 (1999) (purporting to provide
retrospective justification for the Kosovo intervention under international law).
54 Moreover, it seems fair to point out that even if the United States did violate the U.N. Charter's
restrictions on the use of force (Article 2(4) in particular) by attacking Iraq, that infraction was hardly
unique in the Charter's history. In a classic article written thirty-six years ago, the international law
scholar Thomas M. Franck pronounced Article 2(4) dead: "today the high-minded resolve of Article 2(4)
mocks us from its grave ....
[A]s with Ozymandias, only the words remain." Thomas M. Franck, Who
Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 809-10 (1970).
55 See generally Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
56 A positivist view of international law rather than a natural law view has been characteristic of
American jurisprudence since at least the post-Civil War period. See Stephen M. Feldman, From
Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387,
1421-25 (1997); William S. Dodge, The Story of the Paquete Habana: Customary International Law as
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or constraints upon its sovereignty except those that have arisen from its actual or
express consent. 57 This approach enables the United States to argue that it is not
constrained by customary law unless it has specifically endorsed or adopted it or,
still less, by jus cogens (a category of law that is purportedly binding even in the
face of a State's deliberate refusal to consent). 58 It also permits the United States
to read its written treaty obligations in a lawyerly way-its critics would say, a
legalistic way. By contrast, the Continental Europeans characteristically favor an
approach to international law that encourages national sovereigns to submit their
powers of unilateral decision-making to consensual, intergovernmental arrangements, to construe their treaty obligations (especially in human rights and humanitarian law) broadly, to rely on and follow custom and, most interestingly of all,
to assume that certain unwritten, natural law norms have a binding effect. If
these broad characterizations are even roughly correct, it could be said that the
United States is tough-minded about international law, and Europe is tenderminded about it. What, then, explains those differences?
III. Rubenfeld: The Difference between American and European
Attitudes toward International Law
Professor Rubenfeld's starting-point is the claim that "the new international
order that emerged after the Second World War had very different meanings in
America and in Europe."' 59 Grasping those different interpretations of the War is,
he argues, "essential to understanding the phenomena of U.S. unilateralism and
European internationalism today."' 60 On this account, pondering the wreckage
Part of Our Law, Soc. Sci. Research Network 10-14, (Nov. 14, 2005) available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=847847.
57 Although this tendency has deep roots in American jurisprudential and political traditions, it has
surely been reinforced by the current "neo-conservative" ascendancy. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 8, at
49, 64-65. However, as Richard Pildes notes, the divergence between European and American understandings of the proper relationship between law and politics has been growing for at least the last twenty
years. See Richard H. Pildes, Conflicts Between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side
of Legalism, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 145, 146-47 (2003).
58 The paradigmatic statement of the jus cogens concept is Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on
Treaties, which provides that "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law ... from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. The ICJ has
from time to time referred to particular norms as jus cogens. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Barcelona
33-34 (Feb. 7).
Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
Although it has antecedents that can be traced back to Roman law, see Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of
InternationalJus Cogens as Formulatedby the InternationalLaw Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946,
948 (1967), the concept ofjus cogens was hardly found in international law until the twentieth century.
See George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Jus Cogens: Root & Branch (An Inventory), 3 TouRo L. Ruv. 203,
207-12 (1986-87); see also Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in InternationalLaw, 31 AM. J.
I'T'L L. 571, 573 (1937) (applying the concept to treaties for the first time).
59 Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1985.
60 Id.; see also MORGAN, supra note 18, at 45 ("Fifty years ago-roughly at the time when the
current process of European integration got going-very few people in European intellectual and scholarly circles had anything favorable to say about nationalism. Conservatives disliked it because of its
revolutionary potential to undermine existing state boundaries; socialists saw it as a threat to the international solidarity of workers; and liberals condemned it as a regressive form of collectivism.").
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left by Nazism, war, genocide and defeat, Europeans drew two fundamental lessons for their constitutional future. The first concerned the evils of nationalism;
the second, the risks of democracy.
First, nationalism. Rubenfeld is undoubtedly right in stating that the end of the
Second World War led to the decline of nationalism all over Western Europe, but
above all in Germany. 6' As Russell Hittinger puts the point, "In 1945, after two
world wars, the crown jewel of modernity-the sovereign nation state-was
brought before the bar of moral judgment. The Protestant theologian, Karl Barth
aptly called this the era of 'disillusioned sovereignty.' ",62 One lasting effect of
the aversion to nationalism has been the continuing drive toward closer European
integration, leading to the creation of supranational bodies such as the European
Union. 63 Indeed, in the words of a former judge on the European Court of Jus61 Various causes might be assigned to the post-War decline of nationalism in Western Europe. The
political scientist John Mearsheimer attributes the decline partly to the active steps that the occupation
forces in Germany took to dampen nationalism, and partly to the fact that since the European states had
been relieved of the need to provide for their own security, they "lacked the incentive to purvey hypernationalism in order to bolster public support for national defense." John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, in THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE 3, 27 (Michael E.
Brown et al. eds., 1998). In addition, Mearsheimer also notes that strategic reliance on nuclear weapons
to maintain the peace of Europe had the effect of "reducing the importance of mass armies for preserving
sovereignty, thus diminishing the importance of maintaining a hyper-nationalized pool of manpower. Id.;
see generally PHILIP BoBBrrr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES:

WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY

190 (2002) (noting connection between emergence of nationalism and strategic need for mass armies).
62 Russell Hittinger, Professor, Univ. of Tulsa, Comments on Yves Simon at The Ethical Traditions
of Europe and the USA: Common Roots and Possibilities for Dialogue 5 (July 19, 2004), available at
http://www.thomasintemational.org/conferences/20040718palermo/russel-paper.htm.
63 After the end of the Second World War, both European and American statesmen and diplomats
favored a type of European federation that would forge close economic ties between Germany and its
Western neighbors, thus at once preventing Communism from spreading to the West and averting the
revival of German militarism. See, e.g., G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 182, 202-03, 207, 209-10 (2001);

see also Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J.C. (C 340) 173; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S., 4 Eur. Y.B. 412, as amended
[hereinafter ECC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S., as amended.
The European Union ("EU"), formally established in 1993, originated in 1957 as the six-member European Economic Community, which itself was the outgrowth of the 1951 Coal and Steel Community
("ECSC Treaty"). See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union:
Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1621-36 (2002) (detailing
origins of EU). The formation of the EU is widely, and correctly, understood to have entailed the diminution of its Member States' national sovereignty. See, e.g., GEORGE SORENSEN, CHANGES IN STATEHOOD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87 (2001) (stating that the EU exemplifies

"a new type of sovereign statehood.., which is qualitatively different from the modem state"); Stephen
D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and InternationalLaw, 25 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1075, 1085 (2004) ("The member states of the EU have used their international legal sovereignty, their right to sign treaties, to create supranational institutions and pooled sovereignty arrangements that have compromised their Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. For instance, the rulings of the
European Court of Justice have direct effect and supremacy in the legal systems of the member states.
Thus, the member states of the EU are not juridicially independent, even though this loss of independence is the result of freely chosen commitments."). European judicial institutions have recognized this
fact: "[b]y creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions ...and, more particularly, real powers . . . [the Member States] have thus created a body of law which binds both their
nationals and themselves." Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, 593 (1964). EU Member
States have now created a system of powerful supranational institutions, including the Council of Minis-
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tice, the guiding purpose of European integration has been "to prevent the evils
of nationalism. 6 4 No longer were the European peoples fated to suffer from
what Jean-Jacques Rousseau had called their "deadly intimacy;" no longer would
it be the case that "the state peculiar to the Powers of Europe is simply a state of
war."' 65 Throughout the course of this extraordinary project, the EU and its precursors have used economic means not only to achieve greater efficiency and
competitiveness and to promote intra-European trade, 6 6 but even more fundamentally to secure deeper political integration. 6 7 While the post-War phenomenon of the erosion of national feeling and national sovereignty has by no means
been confined to Europe, 68 it has been felt unusually keenly there. In the United
States, by contrast, nationalism remains powerful-some would say, too
69
powerful.
ters, the European Commission, a European Parliament, and the European Courts of Justice and Human
Rights.
64 Manfred Zuleeg, A Community of Law: Legal Cohesion in the European Union, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 623, 623 (1997).
65 JONATHAN HASLAM, No VIRTUE LIKE NECESSITY:

REALIST THOUGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-

TIONS SINCE MACHIAVELLI 82 (2002) (quoting Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Extrait du projet perpetuelle de
M. l'Abbd de Saint-Pierre).
66 The same trends were, of course, powerful throughout the entire post-War developed world:
Between 1972 and 1991, it has been estimated, imports grew sixty-five percent more rapidly than
home demand and exports grew twice as fast as the economy as a whole. Neither multinational
corporations nor the national economies in which they operated could therefore retreat from the
global economy without forfeiting their ability to participate in the growth of world trade. In
consequence, governments began to back off from efforts to insulate their economies from competition and sought instead to prevail in the increasingly competitive environment.
JAMES E. CRONIN, THE WORLD THE COLD WAR MADE: ORDER, CHAOS, AND THE RETURN OF HISTORY

248 (1996).
67 See ROBERT GILPIN, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE
21ST CENTURY 193-96 (2000); Robert J. Art, Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO,
111 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 2 (1996) available at http://www.jstor.org/view/00323195/di980452/98pO873w/0
("The desire for security vis-A-vis one another has played a role in the Western European states' second
great push for closer union in the 1990s, just as it did during their first great push of the late 1940s and
early 1950s. In neither phase of Europe's integration can economic considerations alone explain elite
motivations."). The strategy of the EU's architects-Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, Konrad Adenauer
and (later) Jacques Delors-"was to move incrementally with technical and economic measures designed
to increasingly bring member states together in a seamless, interdependent, commercial web of relationships. Each small step of economic integration would result in a slight, sometimes imperceptible erosion
of their national sovereignty. None of the steps alone, they figured, would be enough to arouse the ire of
member states and threaten the furtherance of the Union. The upshot of this piecemeal strategy would be
that 'one day the national governments would awaken to finding themselves enmeshed in a "spreading
web of international activities and agencies," from which they would find it almost impossible to extricate themselves."'

JEREMY RtFKIN, THE EUROPEAN DREAM: How EUROPE'S VISION OF THE FUTURE IS

203-04 (2004).
68 No longer can it be asserted with confidence that "[m]odem man in general has shown a stronger
loyalty to the state than to church or class or other international bond .... [A] modern sovereign state...
might almost be defined as the ultimate loyalty for which men today will fight." MARTIN WIGHT, POWER
POLITICS 25 (Hedley Bull & Carsten Holbraad eds., 1978). Rather, throughout much of the developed
world, it appears that "[t]he nation-state faces ... a double crisis, both of rationality, whereby the state
cannot adequately perform its traditional functions, and of legitimation, whereby the state is unable as a
consequence to rely on mass loyalties." MATHEW HORSMAN & ANDREW MARSHALL, AFTER THE NAQUIETLY ECLIPSING THE AMERICAN DREAM

TION-STATE 219 (1994).
69

See generally ANATOL

LIEVEN, AMERICA

RIGHT

OR WRONG:

AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN NA-

TIONALISM (2004).
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Second, democracy. Rubenfeld argues, rightly in my opinion, that post-War
Europeans also viewed the Allied triumph as "a victory not only against national'70
ism, but [also] against popular sovereignty, [and] against democratic excess."
However resistant we might be to accepting the claim that Nazism and Fascism
were popular movements that achieved power through electoral victories and that
Hitler's program of racism, nationalism, militarism, and conquest long enjoyed
the broad support of the German people, a large body of historical writing beginning with Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1950) and J.R.
Talmon's 1952 study, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, has vindicated
7
that understanding. 1
The trend in post-War European opinion to regard nationalism and popular
sovereignty mistrustfully, even anxiously, has led to profound changes in European constitutional law. Consider, for example, the German Constitution of May
23, 1949-the Grundgesetz or "Basic Law. ' 72 Three fundamental innovations
made by this Constitution deserve notice here.
First, the Grundgesetz begins with a series of nineteen articles enumerating
basic individual rights, thus emphasizing their centrality in the post-War German
regime. Indeed, Article 1 ("Protection of Human Dignity") insists upon the
universality of human rights: in sweeping language, it posits that "[t]he dignity
of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority. .

.

. The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable

human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world."
In emphasizing the centrality of human dignity, the framers of the Grundgesetz
"were well aware that [it] had been utterly trampled by the Nazis.' '73 Breaking
with the main traditions of German jurisprudence, the Grundgesetz "does not
regard the state as the source of fundamental rights. The core of individual free'74
dom, like human dignity itself, is anterior to the state."
Second, equally if not more innovative was the so-called "eternity clause" in
Article 79(3), which set forth that "the basic principles laid down in Article[ ] 1"
were unamendable, along with the three guarantees in Article 20 that Germany
was to be "a democratic and social federal state," that political authority derived
from the "people" and was exercised at elections, and that executive, legislative,
Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1986.
See JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE NATIONALIST CONFLICT (2000); see also Sheri Berman, Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 49 WORLD
POL. 3 (1997) (attributing much of Nazi political success to strength rather than weakness of German
civil society); see generally Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of IlliberalDemocracy, 76 FOREIGN AFi. 22 (1997)
available at http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/other/democracy.html. A controversial explanation of the nexus between Nazism and popular feeling is found in D.J. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING
EXECUTIONERS:
ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996). Goldhagen's account is examined
critically in Fritz Stem, The Goldhagen Controversy: One Nation, One People, One Theory?, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 128 (1996) available at http://www.codoh.comreview/revgoldstern.html.
72 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.). Although the illustration is my own, I believe it
helps to crystallize Professor Rubenfeld's analysis.
70

71

73

DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

P. KOMMERS,
41 (2d ed. 1997).

74 DONALD
MANY
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and judicial powers were to be separated.7 5 As Professor Peter Lindseth's masterful study in The Yale Law Journal of German and French constitutionalism
points out, Article 79(3), while affirming the democratic nature of the German
state, was also designed to limit democratic majorities and even super-majorities:
[t]he purpose of Article 79(3) was to prevent a momentary political majority (following the practice of the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic)
from authorizing the executive or any other body to abrogate the separation of powers or constitutionally protected rights, even if that majority
was of a sufficient magnitude to amend the constitution in order to grant
76
such power.

Third, Articles 92 and 93 of the Grundgesetz established a Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht,which was to act of the final guarantor of constitutional rights. These provisions eradicated any doubt that had
of the
existed under earlier law whether the courts could enforce the provisions
' '77
organic law against the legislature, the executive, or even "the People.
Professor Rubenfeld argues persuasively that the kind of thinking about
human dignity, popular sovereignty, and the limits of state power that shaped the
Grundgesetz carry inescapable implications for the understanding of international
law. 78 In particular, a jurisprudence of the kind found in the Grundgesetz will be
open to, resemble, or even expressly affirm natural law, and will make inevitably
universal claims about human rights and the limits of state power such as those
found in Article 1 of the Grundgesetz. Natural law thinking unquestionably influenced post-War European constitutionalism deeply, through the writings of the
French Roman Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain and other lesser-known
natural law theorists, as well as through the constitution-building activities of
such prominent Catholic political figures as Konrad Adenauer. 79 Gustav Radbruch, Germany's most influential post-War jurisprudentialist and arguably
(though not consistently) a natural law theorist himself, expressed this tendency
forthrightly when he wrote in his first work after the War:
75 See id. at 48 ("One doctrine that has emerged ... is the concept of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment. The doctrine holds that even a constitutional amendment would be unconstitutional
were it to conflict with the core values or spirit of the Basic Law as a whole .... The Constitutional
Court accepted the concept of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment as valid doctrine in the

Article 117 case (1953).").
76 Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of ParliamentarySupremacy: Delegation,Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1388 (2004) (emphasis added).

77 See CURRIE, supra note 73, at 5 (discussing judicial review under Weimar Constitution); id. at
171-72 (discussing judicial review under Grundgesetz).
78 Other scholars have, of course, noted the close historical connection between the atrocities of the
Nazi period and the rise of a new international law. Michael Ignatieff, for example, has observed, with
regard to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), "without the Holocaust,
then, no Declaration." Ignatieff sees the Declaration as "a studied attempt to reinvent the European
natural law tradition." MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 66, 81 (2001).
79 See Edward M. Andries, On the German Constitution's Fiftieth Anniversary: Jacques Maritain
and the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 37-43 (1999).
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There are, therefore, principles of law that are stronger than any statute,
so that a law conflicting with these principles is devoid of validity. One
calls these principles the natural law or the law of reason. To be sure,
their details remain somewhat doubtful, but the work of centuries has
established a solid core of them and they have come to enjoy such a farreaching consensus in the declarations of human and civil rights that only
the deliberate skeptic can still entertain doubts about some of them. 80
Given this constitutional culture, with its grounding in natural law doctrines
and its mistrust of both nationalism and the accompanying belief in popular sovereignty, we should expect, as Rubenfeld says, that the "dominant European understanding today" is that "the fundamental point of international law, and
particularly of international human rights law, [i]s to check national sovereignty,
emphatically including national popular sovereignty." 81 Accordingly, as he says,
"International law enjoys a kind of higher-law status throughout much of Europe
... . It is, for many, a form of constitutional law-a body of supreme law
'82
authorized to override all other laws and governmental decisions.
The passage from constitutional law to international law is mediated by the
concept of universality: as Rubenfeld explains, constitutional rights can be understood (as in Germany) as universal:
They are rights people have by nature, by virtue of being persons, by
reason of morality, or by reason of Reason itself. Constitutional principles ...possess an authority superior to that of politics, including, of

course, democratic politics. This special authority, residing in a normative domain higher than that of politics, is what allows constitutional law
properly to displace the outcomes of political decision making, including
83
democratic decision making.
Constitutional principles, so conceived, cannot be tied to specific nations, peoples, cultures or traditions; they are not contingent elements of some, but not
other, national legal regimes. "On this view, constitutional principles and structures ought in principle to be supra-national. Constitutional rights transcend na80 Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: An ExtraordinaryLegal Philosopher,2 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL'v 489, 496 (2000). Radbruch's post-War views on natural and positive law "occasioned a massive
debate [in Germany] in the late forties and fifties on natural law." Peter Caldwell, Legal Positivism and
Weimar Democracy, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 273, 274 (1994); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, JudicialPositivism
and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1807-08 (1993) ("[I]n 1945, Gustav Radbruch, perhaps
the most influential German legal philosopher in this century, spent the remaining years before his death
in 1949 renouncing positivism and calling for the recognition of law beyond positive statutory law
(ilbergesetzliches Recht). In the first decade or so after 1945, German courts, including the German
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) and the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht),
often invoked Radbruch's endorsement of a limited role for supra-legal concepts and displayed much
hostility toward 'the attitude of an anormative legal positivism (wertungsfreien Gesetzespositivismus) ...
which legal science and practice ha[ve] overcome some time ago.').
81

Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1986.

82

Id. at 1991.

83

Id. at 1991-92.
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tional boundaries. Constitutional principles are superior to claims of national
'84
sovereignty or self-determination.
These characteristics of European constitutional culture, although admirable in
many respects, can also generate considerable friction with non-European nations
that do not comply with Europe's purportedly universal standards. An obvious
example is the death penalty. Although opposition to the death penalty is reflected in a variety of international human rights conventions,85 the most vehement criticism comes from European governments, courts, and public. 86 Former
U.S. Ambassador to France, Felix Rohatyn, has observed that "no single issue
evoked as much passion and as much protest as executions in the United
States ....

[S]ome 300 million of our closest allies think capital punishment is

cruel and unusual and it might be worthwhile to give it some further thought.

'8 7

Dean Harold Koh and Ambassador Thomas Pickering have warned that "[f]or a
country that aspires to be a world leader on human rights, the death penalty has
become our Achilles' heel."'8 8 "Since 1998, the European Union has intervened
repeatedly in U.S. executions through clemency appeals or by conveying its abolitionist views directly to local legislators. '89 There is even some evidence that
the death penalty is damaging joint U.S.-European counter-terrorism efforts. 90
European judicial decisions reflect the same implacable and, some would say,
excessive hostility to the U.S. death penalty. For example, in 1989 the European
Court of Human Rights held in Soering v. United Kingdom91 that extraditing a
German national to the United States to stand trial on a capital charge in the State
of Virginia would violate Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states that "[n]o one shall
84 Id. at 1992.
85 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms, April 11, 1950, E.T.S. No. 114, availableat
http:l/wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/euro/z25prot6.html. But, "[n]o human rights convention abolishes the
death penalty," and "it is difficult to argue that customary international law contains a rule prohibiting the
death penalty." John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human
Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 196 (1998).
86 Although there is a widespread international consensus against the death penalty, negative sentiments seem to be particularly strong among the European elite. Public opinion in leading European
countries had supported the death penalty at the time of abolition. See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. Rav. 97, 109 (2002). European hostility to the death
penalty may stem from a variety of historically contingent causes, including Europe's recent experiences
of massive state-sanctioned violence and persisting ethnic conflicts. Id. at 126.
87 Mark Warren, Death, Dissent and Diplomacy: The U.S. Death Penalty as an Obstacle to Foreign
Relations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 309, 313 (2004); see also Felix G. Rohatyn, Dead to the World:
Executions in America, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 27, 2006, at 8.
88 Warren, supra note 87, at 315 (quoting Harold Koh & Thomas Pickering, American Diplomacy
and the Death Penalty: For a Country That Aspires to Be a World Leader in Human Rights, the Death
Penalty Has Become Our Achilles' Heel, FOREIGN SERV. J., Oct. 2004, at 9, 20-25).

89 Id. at 318.
90 See A. John Radsan, The Massaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota, 31
1417, 1440 (2005).

WM. MITCHELL

L.

REV.

91 See generally Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
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be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 92
Although the Court acknowledged that the Convention itself allowed for capital
punishment in certain circumstances, 93 it held that the circumstances to which the
applicant would be exposed as a death row inmate in Virginia, including the
likely six to eight year delay he would face as his appeals ran, would themselves
pose "a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3.''94 The
Court allowed that "[t]he length of time awaiting death is ...in a sense largely of
the prisoner's own making in that he takes advantage of all avenues of appeal
which are offered to him by Virginia law;" 95 and it also conceded that "[t]he
democratic character of the Virginia legal system in general and the positive features of the Virginia trial, sentencing and appeal procedures in particular are beyond doubt." 96 Nonetheless, even the use of the extradition process to enable
Virginia to try the applicant was considered to be a serious human rights
97
violation.
Summarizing the dominant European position, Jeremy Rifkin writes:
No issue more unites Europeans than the question of capital punishment.
For them, opposition to the death penalty is as deeply felt as opposition to
slavery was for the American abolitionists of the nineteenth century. Indeed, for a society so used to muting its passions, Europeans express a
raw emotional disgust of capital punishment that is not evident anywhere
else in the world. Whenever a prisoner on death row in the United States
is executed, it is barely noticed in America but elicits vehement protest
across Europe. Make no mistake about it: Europeans are the abolitionists
of the twenty-first century, and they are determined to evangelize the
world and will not rest until capital punishment is abolished across the
Earth.

98

92 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Sept. 3, 1953,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
93 Soering v. United Kingdom, I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989), at I 101.

94 Id. atI Ill.
95
96

Id. at
Id. at

106.
Ill.

97 Id. Other European national courts have been influenced by Soering. See, e.g., The Netherlands v.
Short, 29 I.L.M. 1375, 1382 (Neth. 1990). On the other hand, the Canadian Supreme Court arrived at a
markedly dissimilar conclusion in Kindler v. Crosbie, (1991) 2 R.C.S. 779, where it upheld the constitutionality under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of the Canadian Minister of Justice's decision, pursuant to the extradition treaty between Canada and the United States, to extradite a U.S. national
who had been tried and found guilty of a capital offense in Pennsylvania and who had escaped to Canada
before sentencing. Justice La Forest's judgment examined the same "death row phenomenon" that had
persuaded the European Court of Human Rights, but noted that the phenomenon was largely the effect of
a "generous appeal process," and observed that
[w]hile the psychological stress inherent in the death row phenomenon cannot be dismissed
lightly, it ultimately pales in comparison to the death penalty. Besides, the fact remains that a
defendant is never forced to undergo the full appeal procedure .... It would be ironic if delay
caused by the appellant's taking advantage of the full and generous avenue of the appeals available to him should be viewed as a violation of fundamental justice.
Id. at 838.

98

RIFKIN,

supra note 67, at 84.
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So much, then, for European attitudes toward international law, the sources in
European constitutionalism from which they derive, and the aggressive universalism that they sometimes exhibit. What, by contrast, of the characteristic American view of international law? Certainly our dominant jurisprudence does not
accord international law the privileged status of the Constitution itself; indeed,
other than treaties that the United States has ratified and that are interpreted to
permit judicial enforcement, the place of international law in American jurisprudence has been somewhat problematic. 99 Moreover, the American "unilateralism" that Rubenfeld seeks to explain is clearly inimical to the European vision of
international law, as he describes it. On the other hand, American legal and constitutional thinking, like that of post-War Europe, has a decidedly "universalist"
turn. 100 And throughout most of the post-War period, the United States has been
the world's most influential proponent of international law. One need only
glance at the structural features of the United Nations Charter-a Security Council, General Assembly, and ICJ paralleling the American Executive, Congress,
and Supreme Court-or at the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Covenants-paralleling the American Bill of Rights-to see in these foundational documents that fine American hand at work. 10 1 How can these apparently
contradictory strains of thought be reconciled?
Rubenfeld's explanation of the American case proceeds at two levels: through
a description of the American constitutional self-understanding and through an
account of the American interpretation of the Nation's enormous victories in the
Second World War.
First, American constitutionalism is, in its own eyes, "democratic." The
American Constitution has been made, and over time re-made, through "national
99 See generally Andrea Bianchi, InternationalLaw and U.S. Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 EURO. J. INT'L L. 751 (2004).
100 "Americans have at times been the most aggressive proponents of international constitutionalism,
seeking to disseminate or impose (American) constitutional principles around the world, without much
concern about whether these principles reflect other nations' self-given commitments." Rubenfeld, supra
note 4, at 1994.
An instructive recent example of the American tendency to export our own constitutional values is found
in the case of the new Iraqi Constitution. The United States attempted to use its military, diplomatic, and
political leverage to induce the Iraqis to adopt a Constitution that would reflect American (rather than
indigenous Iraqi) traditions and values in various ways. In particular, the United States was anxious that
the new Iraqi Constitution not accord too prominent a place to Islam. The U.S.-drafted Interim Constitution therefore included in Article 7 only bare and abstract language stating that "Islam ... to be considered a source of legislation." Further, Article 7 stated that while the Constitution "respects the religious
identity of the majority of the Iraqi people," it merely "guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice." Iraqi Prime Minister Ja'fari and other Iraqi leaders
sought to establish a more secure constitutional place for Islam. Their view prevailed. The Iraqi Constitution, as approved by the voters of that country on October 15, 2002, states in section 1, article 2, that
"Islam... is a fundamental source of legislation" (emphasis added). Further, section I, article 2 does not
merely "respect" the Islamic identity of the Iraqi majority but "guarantees" it. Finally, protection of
religious liberty and practice is guaranteed to all individuals ... such as Christians, Yazedis, and Mandi
Sabeans" (emphasis added). See generally Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of
the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695 (2004).
101 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 415 (1979)
("[Tihe Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are in their essence American constitutional rights projected around the world.").
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democratic processes."' 0 2 American constitutional law has thus enabled the
American people "to make their own fundamental law-to decide for themselves
on the enduring legal and political commitments that will govern the polity in the
future." 0 3 Although America's constitutional commitments "will include fundamental rights that stand against majority rule at any given moment" and are thus
"counter-majoritarian," they are not therefore "counter-democratic."' 1 4 Rather,
they are democratic because "they represent the nation's self-given law, enacted
through a special, democratic, constitutional politics, subject to democratic
amendment processes in the future." 0 5 Because "democratic constitutionalism is
much more deeply ingrained in American thought and practice (concerning our
own constitutional law) than it is in contemporary European thought and practice
(concerning international law)," Americans will view international law very differently from Europeans. 10 6 While Americans regard their fundamental law as
"made by the people," they cannot possibly view international law in the same
light: international law has been made "in response to the most cataclysmic ex10 7
pression of 'popular will' the world had ever known."
These characteristic American narratives of the diverse origins of constitutional law and international law also help to explain America's post-War "equivocation on international law."' 0 8 In stark contrast to the defeated Europeans,
Americans interpreted the successful outcome of the Second World War as "a
victory for nationalism-for our nation, for our kind of nationalism," and as "a
victory for popular sovereignty (our sovereignty) and a victory for democracy
(our democracy)."'' 0 9 The remedies proposed or approved for a vanquished Europe-an internationalism that would bridle nationalism, a constitutionalism that
would check popular sovereignty-were neither necessary nor useful for the
United States. In remodeling Europe and establishing the new, post-War world
order, the United States refashioned the continent and the globe in its own image:
"when drafting international human rights treaties, founding the United Nations
and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), imposing constitutions on Germany
and Japan, and pushing Europe toward integration, Americans were able to see
themselves as laboring generously, for the sake of people everywhere, to make
the world more American." 10 But simply because the United States was (as it
saw it) Americanizing the world through the construction of a new world order, it
would not itself be bound by all its dictates: "in the American view, all this
internationalism, all this multilateralism, was more for the rest of the world than
it was for us ....
From the beginning, Americans imagined international law
102

Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1993.

103

Id.

104 Id.
105

Id. at 1994.
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Id. at 1994-95.
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Id. at 1995.

Id. at 1989.
Id. at 1986.
110 Id. at 1987-88.
108
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applying to the world, but not applying-or not applying in exactly the same
way-to America." 11I
Such, then, is Rubenfeld's theory in outline. Its brilliance is obvious and its
explanatory power, incontestable. The historical narrative upon which it is
based-even if one might quarrel with it at the margins'12 -

is

broadly true and

I1I Id. at 1988-89. Andrew Moravcsik arrives at similar conclusions, but by a different analytic route.
See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 237-43 (2000) (finding that while "new" post-War democracies such as
Germany and Italy strongly supported international human rights regimes such as the European Convention on Human Rights, established democracies such as Great Britain did not, and seeking to explain
these differences by arguing that the "new" democracies sought to "lock in" protections against the
potential triumph of popular extremist parties, whereas established democracies believed they faced no
such internal political risks).
112 Rubenfeld's argument may overemphasize the extent to which the post-War United States was
unwilling to accept that its international human rights commitments required it to make changes in its
domestic law-especially with regard to racial segregation. Equally, he may fail to acknowledge the
extent to which European nations, in the process of post-War decolonization, refused to honor their
international legal obligations.
On the first point, Rubenfeld rightly notes that U.S. State Dep't Circular No. 175 (Dec. 13, 1955), strenuously resisted the idea that international treaty obligations could entail changes in our domestic law.
Likewise, one might note, the Supreme Court declined to puff the breath of life into Justice Black's,
Douglas's and Murphy's early suggestion that the U.N. Charter would necessitate changes in our racial
laws, see Oyama v. Cal., 332 U.S. 633, 647-50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 673 (Murphy, J.,
concurring); and other courts swiftly foreclosed the possibility of private enforcement of such treaty
obligations, see Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 650 (Cal. 1952). Nonetheless, Russell Hittinger is right
to say that "[m]ost Europeans do not appreciate how profoundly the American constitution was revised in
response to the crisis of the 1930s and 1940s." Hittinger, supra note 62, at 5. Under the pressure of
arguments by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations that the Nation's foreign policy needs required
that the Supreme Court dismantle State-sponsored racial segregation, the Court did so with ever greater
boldness. See Robert J. Delahunty & Antonio F. Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State: The
Supreme Court's Vision of the Police Power in the Age of Globalization,42 Hous. L. REV. 637, 669-75
(2005). If the Court's decisions were not explicitly founded on international human rights agreements,
they certainly reflected the post-War forces that had called such agreements into being.
Conversely, Rubenfeld's argument ignores European disregard for the United Nations and for international human ights law during the wars of decolonization that followed the Second World War, such as
the War in Algeria. During the latter conflict, for instance, France argued strenuously that the United
Nations General Assembly had no competence to consider the situation in Algeria, which France contended was a matter "essentially within [its] domestic jurisdiction" within the meaning of Art. 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter. Indeed, after the General Assembly decided to take up the question of Algeria,
the French delegation left the Assembly and, for a period, it appeared that France might withdraw from
the United Nations. See THOMAS OPPERMANN, LE PROBLPME ALGPtRIEN: DONNIES HISTORIQUES, POLITIQUES, JURIDIQUES 256 (1961).
The French conduct of the war in Algeria was also marked by grave human rights violations. The
disclosures by General Paul Aussarsses of official complicity by leading French political figures in the
Army's use of torture during the war in Algeria brought on a major scandal in France. See PAUL
AUSSARPSSES, THE

BATTLE

OF THE CASBAH:

TERRORISM AND

COUNTER-TERRORISM

IN

ALGERIA

1955-1957 (Robert L. Miller trans., 2002); see also General Aussar~sses' interview in Le Monde, La
Franceface el ses crimes en Algirie [France faces up to its crimes in Algeria], http://www.soldiertestimony.org/France/FranceA1/Document.2004-03-01.3817/view.
However, the French political leadership, governmental bureaucracy, intellectuals and even wider public were well aware through the 1950s
of the Army's practices. For example, after allegations of torture were raised in the National Assembly
in 1955 and all but confirmed by Franqois Mitterand, then Minister of the Interior, the French government commissioned a report from a high-ranking colonial official, Roger Wuillaume, on the use of torture in Algeria. Wuillaume's report (for limited government circulation) not only acknowledged the use
of torture, but also recommended sanctioning it as effective and indispensable. See GIL MEROM, How
DEMOCRACIES LOSE SMALL WARS: STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE FAILURES OF FRANCE IN ALGERIA, ISRAEL
IN LEBANON, AND THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM 112-13 (2003). Public criticisms of the Army

reached a high-water mark in 1957, during the Battle of Algiers, but subsided thereafter, largely because
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illuminating. Most of all, perhaps, it is persuasive in explaining why the differences between the United States and Europe over international law seem so intractable and so passionately felt. Europe's "international constitutionalism," as
Rubenfeld calls it-the insistence that the particular rights and structures embedded in European constitutions are universal in nature-and not the contingent
outcomes of specific national histories, is likely to make disagreements with the
United States (and other non-European powers) harder to resolve. Universalism,
alas, is inherently liable to become belligerent-to demand that human rights and
immunities from State power, as it conceives them, must be realized everywhere. 113 Illustrative of this tendency is the 2004 Barcelona Report, A Human
Security Doctrinefor Europe, which was presented to Javier Solana. The Report
recommends that the
European Union's security policy should be built on human security and
not only on state security. Human security means individual freedom
from basic insecurities .... A human security approach for the European
Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defense of the Union's borders, as was the security approach of nation-states.' 14
A "Human Security Response Force" is proposed to execute this task. 1 5 International law is construed to give the European Union "not only a right, but
also a legal obligation to concern [itself] with human security worldwide." ' 1 6 If
the European nationalism of the past threatened peace, the European universalism of the future bids fair to do the same.
The explanatory success of Rubenfeld's theory on these very points, however,
also exposes some vulnerability in it: his analysis seems weakest in explaining
why the European and American sides should also be willing to compromise
their differences over international law-as indeed they are. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to bridge over differences that arise from alleged violations of fundamental human rights whose existence owes nothing to purely national law and
which it is imperative that every State respect. On the other hand, disagreements
over national interests are intrinsically negotiable: reaching accommodations
the charges had lost their power to shock. Writing in her journal in "this sinister month of December
1961," Simone De Beauvoir said that she, like many others, was "suffer[ing] from a kind of tetanus of the
imagination .... One gets used to it. In 1957, the burns in the face, on the sexual organs, the nails torn
out, the empalements, the shrieks, the convulsions, outraged me." JOHN TALBOTT, THE WAR WITHOUT A
NAME:

FRANCE IN ALGERIA,

1954-1962 93 (1980).

See Hittinger, supra note 62, at 6 (discussing what Yves Simon calls "belligerent universalism").
Zygmont Bauman considers it to be "an integral trait of European identity" to "presume[ ]" Europe's
values to be "universal, all-human; the distinctive feature of European values is to believe that values
'make sense' only if seen as all-inclusive, and are indefensible unless applied to all humanity." BAUMAN,
113

supra note 5, at 125.
114 STUDY GROUP ON EUROPE'S SECURITY CAPABILITIES,

A

HUMAN SECURITY DOCTRINE FOR EUROPE

9, Presented to EU the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana
(2004), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf (emphasis added).
115 Id.at 22.
116 Id. at 10.
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over them is the very stuff of diplomacy. For that reason, if no other,
Rubenfeld's theory must be measured against a theory that is based on a conflict,
not of values, but of interests.
IV.

An Interest-Based Explanation: A Counter-Theory to Rubenfeld's

Many observers have noted in recent years that the United States and its major
Cold War allies are drifting apart. And, as Professor John Mearsheimer has
written,
This trend is most apparent in Europe, where NATO's 1999 war against
Serbia and its messy aftermath have damaged transatlantic relations and
prompted the European Union to begin building a military force of its
own that can operate independently of NATO-which means independently of the United States. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and
Italy are slowly but inexorably realizing that they want to provide for
their own security and control their own destiny. They are less willing to
take orders from the United States than they were during the Cold
11 7

War.

Mearsheimer's words, which were written before September 11 and the Second Gulf War, are certainly far truer now. In a study published last year, Professor Robert Lieber observed that "it is by no means excessive to ask whether the
United States and Europe may now be on the verge of a divorce in which their
alliance of more than half a century collapses or they even become great power
rivals."1 8 Statements by European leaders have underscored a growing sense of
competition and estrangement. Romano Prodi, the former head of the European
Commission, has said that one of the chief goals of the EU is to create "a superpower on the European continent that stands equal to the United States." ' 1 9 Jacques Chirac, the President of France, has said that "we need a means to struggle
against American hegemony." ' 120 A French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine,
echoed Chirac by saying, "We cannot accept . . . the unilateralism of a single
hyperpower."' 12 1 European public opinion, as surveyed by the Pew Research
Center, is deeply unfavorable to the United States.1 22 Josef Joffe, the publishereditor of Die Zeit and no friend of European anti-Americanism, concludes that if
the post-modem States of Western Europe have any "common identity, it defines
117 JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS
118 ROBERT J. LIEBER, THE AMERICAN ERA:

391 (2001).

POWER AND STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 62

(2005); see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 8, at 103-13 (discussing sources of estrangement between the
United States and much of the rest of the world, including Europe).
119 LIEBER, supra note 118, at 62.
120 Id.
121

Id.at 67.

122

See PEW GLOBAL ATrITUDES

PROJECT,

America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns

About Iran, Hamas 1 (2006), available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportlD=252 (citing

that only 39% of the French public, 37% of the German, and 23% of the Spanish, expressed positive
views of the United States).
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itself in opposition to the United States-both its culture and its clout.' 12 3 And
European intellectuals like Zygmont Bauman utterly seethe with resentment at
the American hegemony. In Europe: An Unfinished Adventure, Bauman com-

plains that until recently, Europe had never lived
in the shadow of a power mightier than itself, more ambitious and resourceful in its resolve to set its own ambitions as standards for everyone
else's practice, and so also of holding such imported/imposed standards
up to its own practice as the pattern to follow. Europe had never faced
the threat of being conquered by another continent-and never before had
it been looked at from on high and denigrated as a second-rate power
obliged to swear allegiance to a foreign empire and ingratiate itself to an
alien force it had so little hope of mitigating, pacifying, or converting to
its own ways-let alone of subduing it and subordinating it to its will.
Never had Europe lived with a demeaning awareness of its own inferiority and with the experience of being obliged to look up to patterns of
life preached and practiced by others, of struggling to adjust and adapt its
own acts to such patterns, of emulating alien forms of life and/or match124
ing them by raising its forms of life to their level.
Plainly, post-Cold War Western Europe feels deep misgivings about the global
hegemony held by the United States. These misgivings have two main sources:
one is that the United States will underplay that role, and the other is that it will
overplay it.
Take the first fear: disengagement. American dissatisfaction with the operational complications in the Kosovo War attributed to NATO's cumbersome consultative arrangements fed European fears that we might gradually disengage
from our NATO commitments. 25 Further, although the United States was eventually persuaded to enter the war for Kosovo, its reluctance to do so could hardly
have been greater. Americans and their political leaders were beginning to insist
that a wealthy and democratic Europe should guard its own house and fight its
own wars: the Senate unanimously passed a resolution "bemoaning the 'signifiTHE IMPERIAL TEMPTATION OF AMERICA 123 (2006).
supra note 5, at 45. Bauman sees a way forward, however, that will both overturn
American hegemony and involve Europe in a planetary mission civilatrice: Europe, which itself is
already moving "towards the Kantian world of perpetual peace, in which law, negotiation and cooperation gain the upper hand where violence and raw force once ruled," is now "well prepared if not to lead,
then most certainly to show the way from the Hobbesian planet to the Kantian 'universal unification of
the human species."' Id. at 40.
125 These fears were exacerbated when the United States decided, on the basis of its experience in the
Kosovo War, not to conduct its 2002 campaign in Afghanistan as a NATO operation. See LIEBER, supra
note 118, at 68. The Bush Administration believed that the desire to work multilaterally through NATO
in Kosovo had tied American hands. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 8, at 99. For example, French President
Chirac had stated on French television that "[n]ot a single air strike-and there were about 22,000 of
them-was carried out without France's approval . . . . When France objected, the strikes were not
carried out." Chirac Says He Spared the Bridges, WASH. POST, June 11, 1999, at A17. Other NATO
allies objected to attacking one of Slobodan Milosevic's residences because it housed a painting by
Rembrandt; and Italy asked for an Easter bombing moratorium so that tourism in Venice would not be
injured. See ROGER W. BARNETT, ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE: TODAY'S CHALLENGE TO U.S. MILITARY
POWER 57 (2003).
123 JOSEF JOFFE, UBERPOWER:
124 BAUMAN,

Volume 4, Issue I

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

The Battle of Mars and Venus

cant shortcomings' in European defense capabilities and urging the European
Union to rectify the 'overall imbalance' within the Atlantic Alliance."'' 2 6 Fear of
American disengagement after the Kosovo War in turn led European leaders to
create the European Union Rapid Reaction Force in December, 1999 and provided the backdrop for the establishment of the European Defense Agency
("EDA"), an EU armed force independent of NATO, in July, 2004. Among other
purposes, the EDA could serve one function that NATO has: keeping the peace
on the European continent by preventing conflict, not only between the Western
European powers and the Russians, but also among the Western European powers themselves. 127 NATO has served that purpose by ensuring that the United
States would throw its full military weight on the side of any NATO member that
was attacked-including by another NATO member. 128 More subtly, NATO has
also achieved that end by making the military strength, capabilities, and intentions of each of the major Western European allies utterly transparentto each of
the others. The Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey has argued persuasively
for the thesis that "[w]ars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength."' 129 Certainly there is abundant evidence that ignorance of each
others' capabilities or uncertainty about its purposes can draw potential belligerents into actual hostilities.' 30 The NATO Alliance has reduced the risks of Euro126 CHARLES A. KUFCHAN, THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA:

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE GEOPOL-

ITICS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 64 (Alfred A. Knopf, pb., 2002).

127 See Art, supra note 67, at 3 ("Western Europe's drive to create a European Defense Identity (EDI)
•..was motivated by three elite worries: fears about the power of a newly reunited Germany; concern
that the United States might leave Europe now that the Cold War had ended; and as a consequence of the
first two, the nightmare that Europe might revert to its destructive nationalistic past unless corrective
steps were taken.").
128 See Mearsheimer, supra note 61, at 45 ("America's hegemonic position in NATO ... mitigated
the effects of anarchy on the Western democracies and facilitated cooperation among them ....[S]tates
do not trust each other in anarchy and they have incentives to commit aggression against each other.
America, however, not only provided protection against the Soviet threat, but also guaranteed that no EC
state would aggress against another. For example, France did not have to fear Germany as it rearmed,
because the American presence in Germany meant that the Germans were not free to attack anyone.").
129 GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF WAR 293 (3d ed. 1988).
130 See id. at 115-24, 241-42. By the same logic, transparency can prevent war. See STEPHEN VAN
EVERA, CAUSES OF WAR: POWER AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT 137-42 (1999) (adducing historical
evidence that military secrecy contributes to likelihood of war, while openness diminishes risks); see also
PHILIPPE DELMAS, THE Rosy FUTURE OF WAR 226 (1995) ("Transparency . .. allays suspicions. It is
because the United States was able to fully inform both India and Pakistan about each other's military
preparations in 1989 that it was able to convince both countries not to drift into war-which would
undoubtedly have been nuclear."); CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 76 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret
eds. & trans., 1984). As von Clausewitz realized, in a world of perfect information and rational choices,
"one would never really need to use the physical strength of the fighting forces-comparative figures of
their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra." Id.
Later scholars have given the name "The War Puzzle" to this phenomenon:
[SItates led by rational decision makers should not fight because both sides could avoid the costs
and risks of war by negotiating a prewar bargain reflecting their relative power ....Since wars
do happen, it appears that states overestimate their relative power. At the brink of war, history
tells us, rivals' estimates of their chances of winning commonly sum to more than 100 percentfor example, both think that they have more than a 50 percent chance of winning (one thinks it
has an 80 percent chance and the other thinks its chance is 40 percent), an attitude that betrays
unwarranted confidence on one or both sides.
DOMINIC D.P. JOHNSON, OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR: THE HAVOC AND GLORY OF POSITIVE ILLUSIONS 4
(2004).
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pean conflict by ensuring that the French, German, and British militaries would
so interpenetrate each other that such ignorance or uncertainty would be impossible. If America were induced to withdraw from NATO and if, as a result, the
Alliance were to disintegrate, such transparency might disappear, and the risks of
an intra-European war would be correspondingly heightened. The Europeans
may be contemplating an integrated EU military as an alternative to NATO, not
so much because they fear the Americans, but because they fear one another.'31
The problem with American hegemony, from this perspective, is not that the
United States will intervene in European affairs, but that it will turn its back on
32
them.'
The second major source of European misgivings about American hegemony
is the fear that the United States will overplay the part, leading to the further loss
of European political independence, cultural distinctiveness, or the ability to influence world affairs. Here, as before, one can discern the stirrings of what
might eventually ripen into a traditional Great Power rivalry-though in this case
the rivals would not be the different continental powers themselves, but the EU
and the United States. The EU is now a match for the United States in several
key dimensions-except military133-including population, wealth, and increas131 Those who doubt the very possibility of a war between European powers should reflect on the
reasons why Britain, France, and Russia all opposed German reunification in 1989. See PHILIP ZELIKOW
&

CONDOLEEZZA

RICE, GERMANY

UNIFIED

AND EUROPE TRANSFORMED:

A

STUDY

IN STATECRAFT

114-18, 132-34, 137-39, 144-45, 204-08 (1995); see also Art, supra note 67, at 10-14. Indeed, many
Germans opposed reunification out of self-mistrust, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, despite being the chief
architect of reunification, insisted on a policy of "Europeanizing Germany, not Germanizing Europe."
Id. at 23-24.
True, what is called "democratic peace theory"-the doctrine that democracies never (or rarely) go to
war with each other-would suggest that the chance of war between or among Western European powers
is negligible. But even though democratic peace theory seems to guide American foreign policy, there
are substantial reasons, both theoretical and empirical, to doubt its truth. See Christopher Layne, Kant or
Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5, 45-49 (1994).
132 This fear is by no means unrealistic, especially given the "casualty-aversion phenomenon" that has
been so prominent a feature of America's recent military operations. See Colonel Charles J. Dunlop, Jr.,
A Virtuous Warriorin a Savage World, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 74 (1998), available at http://www.usafa.af
.mil/documents/virwar.doc (introducing the term "casualty-aversion phenomenon"). As Colonel Dunlop
points outs, both the electorate of the United States and its military have exhibited a marked aversion to
incurring virtually any friendly casualties in most military operations. Consider, for example, the refusal
of the United States to use ground troops in the Kosovo campaign; the hasty withdrawal of the United
States from Somalia caused by the deaths there of eighteen Rangers during a 1993 mission; or the U.S.
public's misgivings about the current war in Iraq, despite the small number-by historical standards-of
U.S. casualties in the war. Even more strikingly, Colonel Dunlop notes the U.S. public's apparent
demand that wars be won with the minimum number of casualties on the enemy's side, even when those
losses are inflicted without violating the Laws of War. In the First Gulf War, for instance, the American
public recoiled at the bombing of Baghdad's Al Firdos bunker, an underground command and control
facility that was also being used to shelter the families of high Iraqi officials; see also BARNETT, supra
note 125, at 46 ("Perhaps the logical extreme was reached in the Clinton Administration's 1994 cruise
missile attack on Iraq in retaliation for the failed assassination plot against ex-President Bush. The
launches were carried out against the Iraqi intelligence agency that planned the attempt. But they were
executed at night, when the guilty parties were almost certain not to be in their offices."); ALLAN C.
STAM, III, WIN, LOSE, OR DRAW: DOMESTIC POLITCS AND THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR 27 (1999) (noting that

the levels of violence the United States inflicted on North Vietnamese unnerved the deliverers of the
violence, not its recipients).
133 On Europe's military liabilities, see LIEBER, supra note 118, at 85-88.
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ing global influence. 134 Indeed, nineteenth century roles conceivably might reverse in the twenty-first century: an emerging European giant on one side of the
Atlantic, economically strong but as yet militarily weak, and an established Great
Power on the American side, militarily formidable but perhaps past its economic
prime. 35 At any rate, given the growing strength and self-confidence of the EU,
the disappearance of the Soviet threat to Europe, the embarrassments that the
American alliance can create for Europe in the Islamic world, and the irksomeness of American leadership, one should expect to find-and does find-emerging conflicts of interest between the United States and Europe.
Not surprisingly, international law might be used as an instrument to advance
or retard the pursuit of such interests. For better or for worse, international law
lends itself readily to the needs of Great Power statecraft: Josef Joffe was not far
wrong in saying that international law is "a most pliant code [that] nations have
always bent to their purposes."' 136 For much of the Cold War, the United States
routinely castigated the Soviet bloc for its violations of international human
rights law, while turning a blind eye (or a near-blind eye) to human rights violations in countries such as Marcos's Philippines, Pinochet's Chile, Samoza's Nicaragua or, for that matter, the Soviet Union during the early 1970s, in the pursuit
of ditente. To take an interesting but less well known example, Great Britain
declared war on Germany in 1914 allegedly on the basis of Germany's violation
of Belgium's neutrality, of which Britain claimed to be, by treaty, the guarantor. 137 But Germany had previously invaded Luxembourg, whose neutrality Britain had also guaranteed, with no demurral by the British. The crucial difference
was the Belgium fronted the English Channel-a zone of extreme strategic sensitivity to Britain-while Luxembourg did not. 1 38 Although Britain's true concern
was the German threat to its national security rather than Germany's violation of
134 See RFKIN, supra note 67, at 61 ("The European Union, what some observers call the 'reluctant
empire,' is already a looming giant, although still in its infancy. Four hundred and fifty-five million
people are citizens of the European Union. They represent nearly 7 percent of the human race .... [T]he
EU already overwhelms the U.S., whose 293 million people constitute 4.6 percent of the human race....
The European Union is now the largest single internal market as well as the largest trader of goods in the
world. The EU is also the world's largest trader in services.... The European Union's Gross Domestic
The bottom
Product of $10.5 trillion in 2003 already exceeds the United States' $10.4 trillion GDP ....
line is that the EU's GDP already comprises nearly 30 percent of the GDP of the world, making the
European Union a formidable competitor to America in the global economy.").
135 See, e.g., KUPCHAN, supra note 126, at 62 ("The near-term challenger to America is not a single
country trying to play catch-up-which takes time-but a European Union that is in the process of
aggregating the impressive economic resources that its member nations already possess .... [A]mass
their collective wealth, add the resources of more than a dozen other European countries-perhaps including before too long a recovered Russia-and an economic behemoth is on the horizon.").
136 JOFFE, supra note 123, at 48.
137 British leaders and high-ranking officials, including Prime Minister William Gladstone in 1870,
had long doubted whether Belgian Guarantee Treaty of 1839 committed Britain unconditionally to resist
and violation of Belgian neutrality. See CARR, supra note 7, at 183-84. Some legal scholars during the
First World War also argued that Britain did not, in fact, have any treaty obligations to guarantee Belgian
neutrality. See ALEXANDER FUEHR, THE NEUTRALITy OF BELGIUM:

A STUDY OF THE BELGIAN CASE

UNDER ITS ASPECTS IN POLITICAL HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1915).

138

42

See BLAINEY, supra note 129, at 236 n*.
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international law, 1 39 it was in no way remarkable that it should have advanced
the latter rather than the former as its stated reason for war.
Several commentators have contended that Europe has been using international law as a means to control and restrain American hegemony. Their arguments are persuasive. The American political scientists John Ikenberry, 140 and
following him Stephen Walt,' 4 1 have made a careful study of the various mechanisms by which European and other powers have responded to the massive reality of American global power. Ikenberry notes that there are two extreme or
ideal-type strategies for coping with such concentrated power. One strategy,
which he calls "balancing," is to attempt to resist a dominant State through aggregating countervailing power by forming a coalition against it. The opposite strategy, which he calls "binding," attempts to make the dominant power less
threatening by "embedding that power in rules and institutions that channel and
limit the ways that power is exercised."' 42 Both strategies can be manifested in a
rich variety of ways; each has its strengths and limitations; both can be pursued,
separately or together, with greater or less overt hostility. In addition to "balancing" and "binding," weaker States can follow strategies that Ikenberry calls "buffering" (developing alternative regional political spheres); "baiting" (forming
groupings of weaker States that are designed in part to lure the dominant State
into interaction, and eventually conformity, with the groupings); "bargaining";
"bandwagoning" (adopting policies designed to support or accommodate the
dominant power); "bonding" (a version of bandwagoning in which the leaders of
weaker powers form "special relationships" with the dominant power or its Executive); and "specialization" (seeking out niche specialties in military and economic affairs that may prove useful or necessary to the dominant State).
Europe's uses of international law can readily be seen as a type of "binding"
strategy enabling it more effectively to tame American power. Such a strategy
can be pursued, and correspondingly resisted, in at least two broad ways.
The first way is by attempting to reduce the freedom of action of the United
States by inducing it to enter into international institutions or to accept international rules that would create new international obligations for it. Obvious examples here would be the Rome Statute or the Kyoto Protocol which, if ratified by
139 According to the official report of August 4, 1914, prepared by the British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Edward Goschen, he personally informed the German Chancellor that "it was, so to speak, a
matter of 'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to
do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or
what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?" See Sir
Edward Goschen, Official Report of the Breaking of Diplomatic Relations and of the "Scrap of Paper",
Aug. 4, 1914, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/scrapofpaperl.htm. Prime Minister Sir Edward
Grey's speech of August 3, 1914, before the House of Commons spoke more candidly of Britain's
"obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty." 65 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1914)
1809 (emphasis added).
140 See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL CONFERENCE REPORT, STRATEGIC REACTIONS TO AMERICAN PREEMINENCE: GREAT POWER POLITICS IN THE AGE OF UNIPOLARITY (2003),
available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports-stratreact.html.
141 See STEPHEN M. WALT, TAMING AMERICAN POWER: THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO U.S. PRIMACY
144-52 (2005).
142 IKENBERRY, supra note 140, T 44.
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the United States, would have bound it to commitments that its political leadership considered inimical to its security interests and its economic vitality. American responses to these proposed new institutions included, not merely the refusal
to join them, but also, e.g., attempts to carve out special immunities from ICC
jurisdiction for the U.S. military forces in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia. 143
The second way is by arguing that the United States is breaching its existing
international legal commitments or obligations, and by applying, or threatening
to apply, legal or diplomatic sanctions as a result. Thus, for example, European
governments might cite to alleged U.S. violations of international human rights
agreements or provisions of international humanitarian law to which the United
States is a party. The United States typically replies by denying the factual allegations at issue, by pleading circumstances claimed to excuse or justify its actions, or by interpreting the relevant legal obligations more narrowly. At the
extreme, the United States might rescind its earlier legal commitments as it has
done (or sought to do) by withdrawing its consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction in
Consular Convention cases, for example. 144
American political scientists are not alone in viewing European-American
clashes over international law through the prism of interest analysis, and in seeing the use of a binding strategy at work in at least some European legal claims.
One such European commentator, Josef Joffe, argued that many recent "international law" disputes between the United States and other powers are
[a]ufond, ... not about principle, but power.... [S]o with the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the end, even the Clinton team correctly
understood the underlying thrust of the ICC. Claiming the right to pass
judgment on military interventions by prosecuting malfeasants ex post
facto, the Court might deter and thus constrain American forays abroad.
would gain a kind of droit de
All the Lilliputians [i.e., the Europeans]
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regard over American actions.
An interest-based theory of the kind put forward by writers such as Ikenberry,
Walt, and Joffe appears to have as much power as Rubenfeld's in explaining the
rifts between Europe and America over international law. What is more, an interest-based account may be more successful than a values-based one in explaining why European and American differences in international law can be, and
sometimes are, compromised.
To illustrate this aspect of interest analysis, consider Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, which, together with subsequent related Resolutions,
143 See Bryan MacPherson, Authority of the Security Council to Exempt Peacemakersfrom International Criminal Proceedings,AM. Soc'Y oF INT'L L. INsIGHTS (July 2002), availableat http://www.asil
.org/insights/insight89.htm.

144 See Frederick L. Kirgis, President Bush's DeterminationRegarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. INsIGHTS (March 2005) (Addendum to ASIL Insight),
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insightsO5O3O9a.html.
145 Josef Joffe, The Twentieth Annual John Bonython Lecture, Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule
the World (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://www.cis.org.au/Events/JBL/JBL03.htm.
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addressed the international standing of the Iraqi government that was beginning
to emerge after the Second Gulf War, and delineated roles for the various institutions, including the United Nations, in the transition to a new, internationally
recognized Iraqi government.
Resolution 1483, which was sponsored by the United States and its coalition
allies Britain and Spain, was adopted by a 14-0 vote in the Security Council
(Syria being notably absent). As one commentator said, the Resolution "bore the
hallmarks of a compromise throughout."'' 4 6 Specifically, it created a loose
framework under which the Anglo-American dominated Coalition Provisional
Authority ("CPA"), a contemplated "Iraqi interim administration . . .run by
Iraqis" distinct from the CPA, and the United Nations would together share responsibilities with respect to the transition to an internationally-recognized, representative government in Iraq. The Resolution lifted longstanding international
sanctions against the r6gime of Saddam Hussein and guaranteed the participation
of the United Nations in monitoring the export of Iraqi oil, making it possible for
the oil to be sold in world markets without legal hazard. On the other hand, as
the French delegate to the Security Council, M. de la Sabli~re insisted, the Resolution also ensured that the United Nations would play a crucial political as well
as humanitarian role alongside the Anglo-American coalition in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. 14 7 He further reminded the coalition that the Resolution
"affirm[ed] the obligations of the occupying Powers in this area, in conformity
with their obligations under international humanitarian law."' 4 8 Gunter Pluger,
the German delegate, after noting that the Resolution was "a compromise reached
after intensive and sometimes difficult negotiations," also laid stress on the fact
that the United Nations was to have "a central role in the political and economic
49
process" of reconstruction.1
As legal commentators noted, one outstanding and unresolved point of difference between the Anglo-Americans and their continental European antagonists
concerned "the ex post validating effect, if any, of Resolution 1483."150 Was the
Resolution to be construed as a legal ratification of the coalition's armed intervention in Iraq in March, 2003-over the prospective authorization of which the
Security Council and its Permanent Members had been so bitterly divided three
months earlier? Did it fall short of a ratification of the original intervention, but
146 Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
823, 824 (2003).
147 Id. at 830 ("From the Franco-German-Russian viewpoint, the resolution ...
serves two purposes:
it reengages the [United Nations] after a period of relative withdrawal; and it contains the AmericanBritish coalition, the initiative for which France, Germany, and Russia had sought to curtail prior to the
hostilities.").
148 U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761 (May 23, 2003) ("[T]he resolution substantiates the essential role of the United Nations, which France, alongside others, has tirelessly
defended. More than ever before, the strong and independent involvement of the United Nations in
defining and leading the political process will condition the success of this exercise-in other words, its
ownership by the Iraqi people and its acceptance by countries of the region and by the international
community.").
149 Id. at 5.

150 Grant, supra note 146, at 826.
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nonetheless have some legal effect on the ensuing occupation?15 ' Or was it,
legally, a nullity?

The U.S. State Department did not explicitly claim that Resolution 1483 ratified what had previously been an unauthorized and illegal Charter violation.
How could it have done so, given its own arguments earlier in the year that the
resumption by the United States of hostilities in Iraq accorded with Iraq-related
Security Council Resolutions from a decade before? On the other hand, the State
Department did try to squeeze legal juice out of the lemon. In November, 2003,
a State Department spokesman, Assistant Secretary Kim R. Holmes, characterized Resolution 1483 in the following way:
We do not want to find ourselves implying that, since the [Security]
Council could not agree on a military course of action during the debate
in February [2003] on a second resolution, that it was the will of the
international community that Saddam Hussein be allowed to continue to
torture and murder his people. The Council, in fact, had spoken on the
matter, and indeed it has spoken since ....

[I]n Resolution 1483, it has

recognized the legitimacy of the coalition presence under international
law. 152
What this characterization leaves unexplained, of course, is why the United
States should have desired the Security Council to affirm that the coalition's
presence in Iraq was legitimate, if the United States found itself in Iraq as a result
of having taken nothing but lawful steps.
Regardless, the key point is that the United States and the European nations
aligned against it in the Security Council found in Resolution 1483 a viable and
pragmatic way to compromise, if not resolve, their bitter differences over the
legality of the Iraq War. 153 The United States could hardly have asked for-and
perhaps failed to obtain-the ratification of an invasion that it had defended as
fully legal not long before; but it did want some measure of affirmative legal
authorization going forward for its presence in Iraq and for its activities as occupier, if not as invader. If, moreover, this prospective legitimation could plausibly
be construed as an admission by the Council, however tacitly and grudgingly,
that it had been wrong to withhold authorization in advance of the Iraq war, then
so much the better. For their part, the French, Germans, and Russians all had an
151 See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION iX (2004) (resolution "provided
a mechanism to legitimate the [Coalition's] temporary control of Iraq.").
152 Kim R. Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Remarks at a
Conference on The Future of the UN and International Law, sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation The UN Charter: Then and Now, (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rml
2003/26960.htm.
153

See Richard Falk, After Iraq Is There a Futurefor the CharterSystem? War Prevention and the

Jul. 2, 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/
law/2003/0702unfuture.htm (arguing that Resolution 1483 indicates a tension within the Security Council
over the Anglo-American recourse to war: On the one hand, it divides responsibility between the Coalition and the U.N. for Iraq, granting the Coalition control over the most vital concerns of economic and
political reconstruction and governance; on the other hand, it stops far short of retroactively endorsing the
Coalition's intervention).
UN,
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interest in conferring some measure of legitimacy on the U.S. occupation, while
being able to maintain consistently the position that the original U.S. intervention
had been unauthorized. The U.S. occupation of Iraq was, by May 2003, an established fact; and to allow the United States to continue its occupation indefinitely
without the sanction of the Security Council could over time only weaken the
Council's influence and authority. These three Council Members likely felt that
the currency they possessed-the power to legitimate the coalition's actionshad to be spent before it dwindled in value. Both sides had a compelling interest
in saying that the Iraq War had not stripped the Security Council of its legal
authority, brought down the United Nations Charter, or caused irreparable damage to the fabric of international law.
Put another way, at the time of Resolution 1483's adoption, the relationship
between the United States on the one side and the Franco-German-Russian bloc
on the other was not unlike that which existed on December 2, 1804 in the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris between Napoldon on the one side and Pope Pius VII
on the other, as the Pope watched Napol6on, who was standing (rather than
kneeling) before him, lift the crown of the Emperor of the French out of the papal
hands and place it on his own head. 15 4 Both Napoleon and the Pope had something to gain from this curious transaction (to which the Pope had agreed beforehand). From Napoleon's point of view, his action was a way of dramatizing the
claim that his authority did not come from the Church, but from another source
(himself?). At the same time, however, the Pope had anointed Napoleon only
shortly before; and the Pope's very presence at the Emperor's (self-)coronation
lent Napoleon's claim to the imperial title a legitimacy that it otherwise would
have lacked. A papal consecration at the cathedral in Paris conferred on the new
Emperor a cachet in royalist, Catholic, and international circles that Napoleon
could never have created for himself. 55 So it was between the United States and
the Security Council: the holder of power and the holders of legitimacy found it
in their mutual interest to agree rather than disagree.
V.

A False Dichotomy

So far, this paper has contrasted two theories that offer to explain, on different
grounds, the existence of a characteristic divergence in attitudes toward international law between Europe and the United States. One theory sounds in values,
the other in interests. But the choice may conceivably be a false one. This brief
concluding section addresses that possibility.
While abstractions may be illuminating, it is surely wrong to think of Europe,
or the United States, as a monolith. European attitudes toward international law
may be either attitudes characteristic of European governments or those characteristic of European publics. European publics (especially perhaps certain 61ites
within them) may have views about the morality or legality of American policies
See STEVEN ENGLUND, NAPOLEON: A POLITICAL LIFE 243-46 (2004).
Id. at 244 ("No other major European sovereign showed up at an event to which all of them were
invited and all considered the defining moment of any monarch's life, yet the presence of the leader of
Christendom outweighed their collective absence.").
154
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that are held with great intensity and conviction. Those constituencies, who may
be important actors in European domestic politics, will urge their views forcefully on their elected political leaders. These leaders, in turn, will likely engage
in what the Israeli political scientist Gil Merom calls "sisterly vigilance" of the
United States.' 56 Democratic governments exercise such "sisterly vigilance"
when they seek publicly to restrain other democracies from engaging in what
they perceive to be radical departures from accepted international standards, particularly in the conduct of war. A good example is Sweden's criticism of the
United States' use of certain weapons systems during the war in Vietnam during
57
the 1960s.1
But because European political leaders, especially in the executive branches of
European governments, have to interact repeatedly with their American counterparts on a wide range of matters of common concern, their criticisms of American war and counter-terrorism policies are likely to be tempered with a high
degree of pragmatism. If their American counterparts are offended by what they
perceive as excessive European condemnation or resistance, the resulting bitterness and antagonism may preclude cooperation on other, important issues. For
instance, while American leaders may have been willing to forgive France for
opposing a Security Council Resolution that would have authorized intervention
in Iraq in 2003, they apparently felt deeply aggrieved by the French Foreign
Minister's trip to Africa to enlist African governments' votes against such a Resolution. In fashioning their policy choices, European leaders therefore have to
keep an eye both on their domestic constituencies and on the likely reactions of
their American counterparts. Their dealings with the United States form is, as
Robert Putnam calls it, a two-level game.
For these reasons, we should expect to find not so much a divergence between
European and American views of international law, but rather two divergences,
one greater and one less. First, a more marked divergence between American
views, or rather, the views of American political leaders, and the views of European publics (especially, perhaps, articulate and influential 61ites in sectors such
as higher education, law, and journalism); and second, a less marked divergence
between American political leaders' views and the views of European governments (especially the executive branches that interact most frequently with those
American political leaders). That is exactly what one sees in the rather equivocal
remarks of Chancellor Merkel cited near the start of this paper. While both interests and values will likely figure in explaining both of these divergences, values
will likely be more important in explaining the extent of the first divergence, and
interests the comparatively limited divergence in the second case.
156 MEROM,

supra note 112, at 25, 250.

157 See Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke Ishouey, New War, New Weapons? The obligation
of States to assess the legality of means and methods of warfare, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 345, 354
(2002). Sweden went so far as to sever diplomatic relations with the United States during the Vietnam
War. It is now known, however, that some of Sweden's objections to U.S. weapons systems were made
for economic, not humanitarian, reasons. See W. Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEO.
WASH. IN'L L. REV. 511, 513 & n.8 (2006).
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VI.

Conclusion

The argument of this paper has been, first, that the differences between
America and Europe over international law and international institutions are not
as stark and unqualified as they are often represented to be and, second and more
importantly, that such attitudinal differences as there are can be explained as
plausibly in terms of the play of conflicting power interests as in terms of constitutional outlooks, structures, and histories. Without in the least denying the force
and persuasiveness of an explanation that locates the sources of antagonism in a
characteristically European "international constitutionalism" to a characteristically American "democratic constitutionalism," a more banal explanation in
terms of divergent and competing national interests may well suffice. Finally,
the analysis presented here also suggests that the two approaches might well be
understood, not as offering rival explanations of a unitary phenomenon, but as
offering compatible explanations of two distinct but related phenomena-the attitudes of European publics on the one hand, and European governments on the
other.
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